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The invention of Bitcoin in 2008 offered a solution for a digital currency that could be
used without a trusted third-party settling disputes over transactions. Bitcoin relied on
a technology known as the blockchain, which can be described as a distributed database
that relies on a consensus mechanism (generally Proof Of Work is employed) to be resilient
against tampering.
Ethereum, launched in 2015, leveraged the blockchain technology to augment the initial pro-
posal of Bitcoin, enabling computational statements to be executed as part of each block
validation. The platform offers a Turing-complete runtime environment (the Ethereum Vir-
tual Machine), which can run smart contracts - scripts that verify and enforce the execution
of predefined legal contracts.
The technical development of smart contracts present significant challenges that are not
well modeled by the current body of knowledge and practices of software engineering. In
fact, some of the characteristic of blockchain make the contract execution uncontrollable
by the programmer and immutable after deployment. Also, the potential security risks are
considerable, since there is a large incentive to exploit vulnerabilities in a smart contract for
financial gain.
Considering the concerns presented above, the establishment of well understood and well-
defined design patterns for the development of smart contracts is of paramount importance.
In the realm of software engineering, design patterns are defined as generic and reusable
solutions to common problems in software design.
In the context of this work, a survey of design patterns that target the Ethereum frame-
work was performed, with an extensive analysis regarding the context in which they can be
employed, as well as implementations, examples and consequences of their use. A total of
11 design patterns were analysed. The design patterns identified for the Ethereum frame-
work focus on several concerns specific to this platform – most of these concerns revolve
around safety, upgradeability, and the limitations inherent to the sandboxed approach of the
Ethereum Virtual Machine.
A Decentralized Application (dApp) was created to showcase the employment of several of
the identified contracts, and to highlight the value they can provide. This dApp offers a
framework for decentralized betting in a trustless environment, where neither the user needs
to trust the owner nor vice-versa. The dApp implements several use cases that are reliant
on the identified design patterns.





A invenção da Bitcoin em 2018 disponibilizou uma solução para uma moeda digital que
poderia ser usada sem a necessidade de envolver terceiros para a mediação de transações.
A Bitcoin recorre a uma tecnologia conhecida como blockchain, que consiste numa base de
dados distribuída, assente num mecanismo de consenso resistente a alterações não acor-
dadas.
Ethereum, lançada em 2015, utiliza a mesma tecnologia da blockchain para oferecer uma
plataforma que se baseia na Bitcoin, mas que também permite a execução de instruções
como parte do processo de validação de cada bloco. A plataforma permite correr contratos
inteligentes (smart contracts) - scripts que verificam e garantem a correta execução de um
contrato predefinido.
O desenvolvimento técnico de contratos inteligentes apresenta desafios significativos que
não são atualmente modelados pela área de engenharia de software. De facto, algumas das
caraterísticas da blockchain fazem com que a execução de contratos não seja controlável
pelo programador e também com que estes contratos sejam imutáveis após serem colocados
na rede principal de Ethereum.
Tendo em conta os pontos anteriores, é importante o estabelecimento de padrões de desenho
(design patterns) bem definidos para serem usados em contratos inteligentes.
No contexto deste trabalho, foi realizada uma análise dos padrões de desenho usados em
Ethereum, tendo em conta o contexto em que são utilizados, as suas implementações e
exemplos da sua utilização em contratos existentes. Um total de 11 padrões de desenho
foram identificados e analisados.
Uma Decentralized Application (dApp) foi desenvolvida para demonstrar o emprego dos
padrões de desenho identificados. Esta dApp disponibiliza uma framework para se efetuar
apostas de uma forma descentralizada, em que nem o utilizador necessita de confiar no dono
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This chapter aims to explain the context and problem that will constitute the body of work in
this dissertation. The methodology that will serve as the base for the work to be developed
is introduced. Finally, the structure of this document is also presented.
1.1 Context
The emergence of Bitcoin in 2008 [1] offered a compelling solution for a digital currency that
could be efficiently used without a trusted third-party settling disputes over transactions.
The technology that enables this groundbreaking achievement is blockchain, which can be
described as a distributed database that relies on proof of work methods to be resilient
against tampering by malicious actors.
As a technology, blockchain was quickly adopted beyond the original purposes of serving as
a ledger for currency transactions. Ethereum, launched in 2015, rose to preeminence by
proposing a decentralized platform that enables computational statements to be executed
as part of each block validation [2]. In fact, the platform offers a Turing-complete runtime
environment (the Ethereum Virtual Machine), which can be leveraged to run smart con-
tracts - scripts that verify and enforce the execution of predefined legal contracts [3]. The
blockchain, due to its own properties, can provide guarantees that the transactions initiated
by the smart contract are truthfully executed.
1.2 Problem
While the use of smart contracts has been increasingly popular, particularly in the Ethereum
ecosystem, they present significant technical challenges that are not well modelled by the
current body of knowledge and practices of software engineering [4]. In fact, some of the
characteristic of blockchain make the contract execution uncontrollable by the programmer
and immutable after deployment [5].
The potential security risks are very large, as there is a large incentive to exploit vulnerabilities
in the smart contract for financial gain [4, 5]. This is compounded by the fact that the source
code for the smart contracts is public, since it is part of the blockchain once deployment
occurs.
Moreover, current development tools do not offer adequate support, which, conjugated with
poor architectural design decisions, augments the probability of existence of security issues
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[6]. Inadequate software development practices have been considered the main cause of
successful attacks [7], and to cement the field of blockchain based software engineering is,
in this context, a critical endeavour.
Considering the concerns presented above, the establishment of well understood and well-
defined design patterns for the development of smart contracts is of paramount importance.
1.3 Objectives
The main objectives of this work are:
• Identify common patterns in publicly available smart contracts targeting the Ethereum
framework.
• Compare available patterns and identify the advantages and drawbacks of specific
design patterns, according to their aim, as well as their costs.
• Implement proof of concepts for various design patterns.
1.4 Research Methodology
With the high growth and increasing interest on smart contracts, addressing the specific
challenges that they pose in terms of security as well as in the broader sense of software
engineering practices is fundamental.
The Ethereum platform, as the primary framework for smart contracts deployment and
execution, has been the target of high profile attacks, which resulted in the loss of large
quantities of Ether, valued in hundreds of millions dollars. Inefficient computations in the
currently deployed smart contracts are also a source of major losses, since these inefficiencies
are levied onto the users in the form of unnecessarily high transaction costs.
An extensive knowledge of these drivers is required to base the work developed in this project.
As such, in an initial phase, a survey of the Ethereum smart contract landscape was done,
in order to identify high profile examples of lack (or wrongful) of use of design patterns.
Based on the available open sourced contracts, an identification of implemented design
patterns was performed. In both cases, priority was given to the most relevant contracts.
Following this initial stage, with a strong investigative nature, a second phase corresponded
to the implementation of smart contracts that showcase the use of the identified design
patterns.
A Gantt chart illustrating the proposed schedule for this work is represented in figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Gantt chart representing the research work schedule.
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1.4.1 Systematic Mapping Study
In order to accomplish the goal of identifying relevant design patterns in the Ethereum smart
contract ecosystem, a systematic approach was followed, ensuring proper review of the
relevant literature. The employment of systematic reviews allows to identify and summarize
empirical evidence of the field, as well as to identify eventual gaps in the state of the art.
While there are several approaches to perform systematic reviews of the literature, the
chosen approach was the systematic mapping review. In this approach, the definition of one
or several research questions is the starting point for the analysis. The research questions
used were:
1. What are the most effective design patterns for smart contract development in the
Ethereum Framework?
2. What are the specific software engineering concerns in the development of smart
contracts?
Search strings and acceptance criteria
In order to conduct a search, a set of search strings was defined:
1. ethereum design patterns
2. design patterns blockchain
3. design patterns smart contracts
4. blockchain software engineering
A set of acceptance criteria, for which all considered papers should comply with, was also
set:
1. only papers written in english
2. only include papers published after 2015
3. only consider papers with at least 5 citations
4. only consider papers with focus on Ethereum and Solidity
Search
The search was performed independently for each search string. For the search string
"ethereum design patterns", the following papers were found:
• A Pattern Collection for Blockchain-based Applications [8]
• A Semantic Framework for the Security Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts [9]
• A Taxonomy of Blockchain-Based Systems for Architecture Design [10]
• An Empirical Analysis of Smart Contracts: Platforms, Applications, and Design Pat-
terns [11]
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• Applying Software Patterns to Address Interoperability in Blockchain-based Healthcare
Apps [12]
• Design Patterns for Smart Contracts in the Ethereum Ecosystem [13]
• Design of Blockchain-Based Apps Using Familiar Software Patterns to Address Inter-
operability Challenges in Healthcare [14]
• Designing Secure Ethereum Smart Contracts: A Finite State Machine Based Approach
[15]
• Detecting Token Systems on Ethereum [16]
• Ethereum Smart Contract Development [17]
• Ethereum Smart Contracts: Security Vulnerabilities and Security Tools [18]
• Ethereum transaction graph analysis [19]
• Ethereum: State of Knowledge and Research Perspectives [20]
• Foundations and Tools for the Static Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts [21]
• Mastering Ethereum: Building Smart Contracts and dApps [22]
• Security Vulnerabilities in Ethereum Smart Contracts [23]
• Smart contracts: security patterns in the ethereum ecosystem and solidity [24]
• Tool Demonstration: FSolidM for Designing Secure Ethereum Smart Contracts [25]
• VeriSolid: Correct-by-Design Smart Contracts for Ethereum [26]
For the search string "design patterns blockchain":
• A Pattern Collection for Blockchain-based Applications [8]
• A typology of blockchain recordkeeping solutions and some reflections on their impli-
cations for the future of archival preservation [27]
• Applying Design Patterns in Smart Contracts [28]
• Applying Software Patterns to Address Interoperability in Blockchain-based Healthcare
Apps [12]
• BlockSci: Design and applications of a blockchain analysis platform [29]
• Blockchain-Enabled Smart Contracts: Architecture, Applications, and Future Trends
[30]
• Chapter One - Blockchain Technology Use Cases in Healthcare [31]
• Comparative Requirements Analysis for the Feasibility of Blockchain for Secure Cloud
[32]
• Design Patterns for Smart Contracts in the Ethereum Ecosystem [13]
• Design of Blockchain-Based Apps Using Familiar Software Patterns to Address Inter-
operability Challenges in Healthcare [14]
• FHIRChain: Applying Blockchain to Securely and Scalably Share Clinical Data [33]
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• How Much Blockchain Do You Need? Towards a Concept for Building Hybrid dApp
Architectures [34]
• On the design of communication and transaction anonymity in blockchain-based trans-
active microgrids [35]
• Toward an ontology-driven blockchain design for supply-chain provenance [36]
• Virtual Resources& Blockchain for Configuration Management in IoT [37]
For the search string "blockchain software engineering":
• A Novel Method for Decentralised Peer-to-peer Software License Validation Using
Cryptocurrency Blockchain Technology [38]
• Adaptable Blockchain-Based Systems: A Case Study for Product Traceability [39]
• An Agile Software Engineering Method to Design Blockchain Applications [40]
• An Empirical Analysis of Smart Contracts: Platforms, Applications, and Design Pat-
terns [11]
• Applying Software Patterns to Address Interoperability in Blockchain-based Healthcare
Apps [12]
• Block-VN: A Distributed Blockchain Based Vehicular Network Architecture in Smart
City [41]
• Blockchain Platform for Industrial Internet of Things [42]
• Blockchain and Artificial Intelligence [43]
• Blockchain and Business Process Improvement [44]
• Blockchain challenges and opportunities: a survey [45]
• Blockchain technology innovations [46]
• Blockchain-Oriented Software Engineering: Challenges and New Directions [47]
• CitySense: blockchain-oriented smart cities [48]
• Comparing Blockchain and Cloud Services for Business Process Execution [49]
• How digital identity on blockchain can contribute in a smart city environment [50]
• Obsidian: a safer blockchain programming language [51]
• Smart contracts vulnerabilities: a call for blockchain software engineering? [52]
• Toward an ontology-driven blockchain design for supply-chain provenance [36]
For the search string "design patterns smart contracts":
• A Concurrent Perspective on Smart Contracts [53]
• A Semantic Framework for the Security Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts [9]
• A Taxonomy of Blockchain-Based Systems for Architecture Design [10]
• An Empirical Analysis of Smart Contracts: Platforms, Applications, and Design Pat-
terns [11]
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• An architecture pattern for trusted orchestration in IoT edge clouds [54]
• Applying Software Patterns to Address Interoperability in Blockchain-based Healthcare
Apps [12]
• Auditing with Smart Contracts [55]
• BitML: A Calculus for Bitcoin Smart Contracts [56]
• Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts [57]
• Chainspace: A Sharded Smart Contracts Platform [58]
• ContractFuzzer: fuzzing smart contracts for vulnerability detection [59]
• Designing Secure Ethereum Smart Contracts: A Finite State Machine Based Approach
[15]
• Enter the Hydra: Towards Principled Bug Bounties and Exploit-Resistant Smart Con-
tracts [60]
• Erays: Reverse Engineering Ethereum’s Opaque Smart Contracts [61]
• Ethereum Smart Contracts: Security Vulnerabilities and Security Tools [18]
• Formal Verification of Smart Contracts: Short Paper [62]
• MadMax: surviving out-of-gas conditions in Ethereum smart contracts [63]
• Mastering Ethereum: Building Smart Contracts and dApps [22]
• ReGuard: finding reentrancy bugs in smart contracts [64]
• Safer smart contracts through type-driven development [65]
• Scilla: a Smart Contract Intermediate-Level LAnguage [66]
• Securify: Practical Security Analysis of Smart Contracts [67]
• Smart Contract Programming Languages on Blockchains: An Empirical Evaluation of
Usability and Security [68]
• Smart Contracts Software Metrics: a First Study [69]
• Smart contract applications within blockchain technology: A systematic mapping study
[70]
• Smart contracts vulnerabilities: a call for blockchain software engineering? [52]
• Smart contracts: security patterns in the ethereum ecosystem and solidity [24]
• SmartCheck: Static Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts [71]
• Tool Demonstration: FSolidM for Designing Secure Ethereum Smart Contracts [25]
• ZEUS: analysing Safety of Smart Contracts [72]
After removing duplicates, a total of 65 papers were found as the result of this search.
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Screening
The screening phase corresponds to an analysis of all the relevant papers identified in the
search phase. This analysis takes into account the pre defined acceptance criteria (in section
1.4.1). Only papers that comply with all acceptance criteria are accepted.
From the original 65 papers, a total of 27 were considered, after the screening phase.
Those papers are:
1. A Pattern Collection for Blockchain-based Applications [8]
2. A Semantic Framework for the Security Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts [9]
3. An Agile Software Engineering Method to Design Blockchain Applications [40]
4. An Empirical Analysis of Smart Contracts: Platforms, Applications, and Design Pat-
terns [11]
5. Applying Design Patterns in Smart Contracts [28]
6. Applying Software Patterns to Address Interoperability in Blockchain-based Healthcare
Apps [12]
7. Blockchain-Enabled Smart Contracts: Architecture, Applications, and Future Trends
[30]
8. Blockchain-Oriented Software Engineering: Challenges and New Directions [47]
9. ContractFuzzer: fuzzing smart contracts for vulnerability detection [59]
10. Design Patterns for Smart Contracts in the Ethereum Ecosystem [13]
11. Design of Blockchain-Based Apps Using Familiar Software Patterns to Address Inter-
operability Challenges in Healthcare [14]
12. Designing Secure Ethereum Smart Contracts: A Finite State Machine Based Approach
[15]
13. Detecting Token Systems on Ethereum [16]
14. Erays: Reverse Engineering Ethereum’s Opaque Smart Contracts [61]
15. Ethereum Smart Contracts: Security Vulnerabilities and Security Tools [18]
16. Foundations and Tools for the Static Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts [21]
17. How Much Blockchain Do You Need? Towards a Concept for Building Hybrid dApp
Architectures [34]
18. MadMax: surviving out-of-gas conditions in Ethereum smart contracts [63]
19. Mastering Ethereum: Building Smart Contracts and dApps [22]
20. ReGuard: finding reentrancy bugs in smart contracts [64]
21. Safer smart contracts through type-driven development [65]
22. Securify: Practical Security Analysis of Smart Contracts [67]
23. Security Vulnerabilities in Ethereum Smart Contracts [23]
8 Chapter 1. Introduction
24. Smart contracts vulnerabilities: a call for blockchain software engineering? [52]
25. Smart contracts: security patterns in the ethereum ecosystem and solidity [24]
26. SmartCheck: Static Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts [71]
27. VeriSolid: Correct-by-Design Smart Contracts for Ethereum [26]
These screened papers served as the basis for the investigation performed in this work.
1.5 Structure
This document is structured as follows:
Introduction in this chapter the context of this work is presented, along with some im-
portant concepts about the work to be developed, the objectives of the work and its
methodology.
State of the Art this chapter focus on providing a sound background on the concepts in-
volved in the development of this work: the fundamental concerns of contracts, the
technical details behind the blockchain technology and the inner work of the Ethereum
platform.
Value Analysis on this chapter, the value that this work can bring to a customer is analysed.
Design Patterns this chapter provides a detailed analysis of several design patterns target-
ing the Ethereum platform.
Betting On The Block dApp this chapter details the implementation of a decentralized
application employing several design patterns.
Conclusion this chapter provides an overview of the achievements of this work, as well as
some considerations for future improvements.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art
In this chapter, an introduction to the conceptual topics that constitute the background to
the work that will be developed are presented, as well as the current state of some of the
technologies that will be researched.
2.1 Contracts
A contract can be broadly defined as a binding agreement between two or more parties that
is legally enforceable. This definition, though not complete, offers a starting point for the
introduction of smart contracts. Contracts allow for a formalization of a relationship, and
can apply to both business and personal relationships (marriage being a classical example).
They have a strong legal character and their study is an important focus of Economics.
Governmental institutions are often used as the third party responsible for enforcement and
arbitration of a contract, although private arbitration can also be employed.
A free market economy, where private parties enter in voluntary exchange of services and
goods for mutual benefit, is extremely dependent on contracts. The lack of enforceability of
these can be a relevant hindrance for economic development, given that it could discourage
mutual beneficial relationships from occurring. The importance of this is reflected in indices
such as the "Enforcing Contracts", where significant correlation is found between contract
enforceability scores and a country economic development [73].
In [74], four basic principles of contract design are defined:
Observability the involved parties should be able to observe the performance of the contract
for all other parties, and to prove their performance.
Verifiability a party should be capable of proving to a third party (arbitrator) that a contract
has been performed or has been breached.
Privity the knowledge over the contents (and performance) of a contract should be dis-
tributed only to the parties involved and limited third parties (arbitrators, for instance).
Enforceability incentives included in the contract should guarantee that the contract is
enforceable.
The concept of smart contracts was coined by Szabo [74], and refers to the idea that several
aspects of contractual clauses can be well modelled by software or even specialized hardware.
The vending machine is given in [74] as a primitive example of a smart contract: a simple
automata will dispense some product if a certain amount of coins is provided and will also
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provide change accordingly. More advanced examples include Point Of Sale software which
process electronic transactions.
Advantages of smart contracts include inherent observability and verifiability, as well improved
enforceability. They can also help circumvent legal barriers, which constitute a large cost
when developing business across different jurisdictions. Another important advantage is
the low transaction costs typically associated with smart contracts - this however is not
guaranteed for cryptocurrencies, as large valuations as well as increasing rate of transactions
have led to very high costs.
2.2 Blockchain
Smart contracts, as explained in [74], typically require one or several trusted third parties
to audit, arbitrate and mediate disputes. This however does bring some of the drawbacks
of standard contracts - the principals need to agree on the third parties to be trusted, and
any attack or malicious actions by this third party could risk the reliability of the contract.
Although it is not the topic of this work, this problem is especially relevant in online commerce
and transactions - a third party always needs to be involved to mediate the transactions,
raising those transactions costs.
Digital signatures (explained in section 2.2.2) can provide a means for electronic transactions
to be performed. A certain party, holder of a private key for an account with funds, could
perform a transaction by digitally signing it. This could ensure that this party intended to
perform the transaction, but no guarantee could be made that he would not reuse the same
funds for another transaction - this is commonly known as the double spending problem. In
order to avoid this, a third party is needed. The mechanism for this type of transactions is
illustrated in figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Representation of a set of digitally signed transactions. From [1].
2.2. Blockchain 11
In [1], it is argued that an electronic payment system should rely on cryptographic proof
instead of trust, thus allowing direct transactions between two parties without a middleman.
This would obviously require solving the double-spending problem. In [1], it is proposed a
distributed approach based on cryptographic proof of work and digital signatures to allow this,
a technology now commonly referred as blockchain. The initial proposed implementation of
this technology was in an electronic coin, Bitcoin.
The solution considers a timestamp server, where various blocks (represented by a hash of its
contents) are chained / linked to each other in a linear fashion. Each new block (represented
by its hash) contains the hash of the previous block. Due to this, each new block reinforces
the ones that precede it. In the implementation of Bitcoin, each block contains a set of
transactions, whose structure is similar to the one represented in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Representation of a chain of blocks. From [1].
2.2.1 Consensus Mechanism
To be secure, a distributed blockchain requires a distributed consensus mechanism, enabling
synchronization and acceptance of the individual chains that each node has access to. In
Bitcoin, this is addressed by a Proof Of Work (PoW) mechanism - each node of the dis-
tributed network must be able to prove the consumption of resources/time to add a new
block to the current chain.
The proof of work used is based on Hashcash [75]. Each node will retrieve a set of transac-
tions from the network to include in the next block and, from there, will start by validating
each of these transactions. The new block to mint will include this set of transactions as
well as the hash of the previous block and nonce - this last item is computed by the proof
of work system. The proof of work will scan for a nonce value that, when hashed with a
cryptographic hashing function, will produce a hash that start with a configurable number
of zero bits - the larger the number of zero bits, the harder the proof.
Mining nodes will compete for being the fastest to mint a new block and since finding the
right nonce is a random process, any malicious actor not in control of the majority of the
nodes would not be able to revert a transaction after it was integrated in the blockchain.
Verifying that the work was done is relatively cheap, which allows the node that computed
the block to broadcast it and other nodes in the system can easily verify that the work was
effectively expended, and would consider the now longer blockchain as the correct one and
would start mining the next block from the new block hash of this chain.
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Bitcoin introduces two incentives for mining new blocks - each transaction can include small
fees to be paid to the mining node and, for a limited time, each new mining node can create
a new bitcoin for itself.
Proof Of Work is the consensus mechanism used by most cryptocurrencies. However, there
are two significant disadvantages associated with this protocol:
• Extremely high energy consumption to maintain the network, at a global scale.
• Low transaction thoroughput.
Alternative Consensus Mechanisms
Due to the limitations of Proof Of Work as a consensus mechanism, research on alternatives
has seen a rise in interest. The most common alternatives are Proof Of Stake (PoS) and
Delegated Proof Of Stake (DPoS), although others were proposed such as Proof Of Capacity
and Proof Of Elapsed Time.
Proof Of Stake consensus relies on the assumption that the holders of large quantities of
the currency would have an incentive to positively participate in the network maintenance
and in increasing the value of their coins. In PoS, any holder of the coin could stake their
property to be allowed to participate in a randomized process to generate a new block -
in case it is selected, the proposing holder would earn transaction fees and, possibly, newly
generated coins.
Delegated Proof Of Stake is another alternative, where the holders of coins can vote for
delegates, in proportion to the amount of coins that they hold. The elected delegates are
then eligible to create new blocks, in the same way as for the PoS method.
Both methods address the main concerns of PoW, enabling higher transaction thoroughputs
and much lower overheads for operating the networks. However, both present their own
type of limitations. In the case of PoS, implementing it has been particularly difficult and
there are no coins with high market capitalizations currently using it. In the case of DPoS,
decentralization is sacrificed, opening up new attack vectors that do not exist for networks
using PoW.
2.2.2 Asymmetric cryptography
The use of cryptography is ubiquitous in any blockchain, as it is used for authenticating
any sender of a transaction. In cryptography, two categories of algorithms are considered:
symmetric and asymmetric cryptography [76].
In symmetric (or conventional) cryptography, the sender and the receiver of a message
hold a shared secret, the key, that can be used to both encrypt and decrypt messages. In
opposition, asymmetric cryptography (or public key cryptography) uses a more convoluted
approach to avoid the problem of having the sender and receiver communicating the shared
secret. In this system, a pair of keys is used - a public and a private key - and if one key is
used to encrypt the message, the other can be used to decrypt it. The public key is generally
published and is available to anyone while the private key is a secret.
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The properties of asymmetric cryptography allows several important use cases. One of those
is digital signatures - as traditional signatures, these guarantee that a given message was
sent by some party with access to a private key, thus ensuring authentication. These digital
signatures are created by encrypting a hash of the message with the private key. A party
with access to the public key can then use that key to decrypt the hash and verify that it
really is the correct hash of the sent message. Since tampering with the message would
change its hash, it is guaranteed that the private key holder was the sender of the message
if this decrypted hash matches the message.
2.3 Ethereum
As previously referred the first implementation of the blockchain technology was focused in
allowing decentralised transactions for an electronic currency, the Bitcoin. However, other
applications were also possible, such as tracking the ownership of physical devices and assets
such as domain names, decentralized financial exchange platforms, peer to peer gambling,
etc. Blockchain also enables the implementation and deployment of decentralized smart
contracts.
The Ethereum platform was proposed as a means to provide a “fully-fledged Turing-complete
programming language that can be used to create “contracts” that can be used to encode
arbitrary state transition functions” [77].
Ethereum expands upon the previous original proposal of blockchain to include a complete
Virtual Machine type of environment running on each node, and code can run as part of the
validation of the creation of each block. This code can alter the state of the blockchain, by
transferring some amount of an ether token. This ether token is the corresponding currency
in the Ethereum platform. Each computational step requires a specific amount of “gas”,
thus creating the incentive for mining nodes to run the code in each smart contract, as well
as for smart contract developers to ensure that the execution of the code is as performant
as possible.
Although Ethereum is built on top of the Bitcoin platform Turing incomplete scripting, it
offers significant features:
• It is Turing complete (it allows, for instance, loop constructs).
• Value-awareness, meaning that the code has access to the value and parties involved
in a transaction.
• Blockchain awareness.
In [77], the blockchain is conceptualized as being the history of changes to the state of a
decentralized database. As such, each block will consist of the set of changes to the previous
state. The state of the Ethereum blockchain is considered to be formed by a set of objects,
the accounts. Each state transition will consist of transfers of value (Ether) and information
between the accounts. An account contains the following information:
• Nonce, a simple counter
• Current Ether balance
• Contract code
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• Account storage
Two types of account can be considered: externally owned account and contract accounts.
Externally owned accounts are controlled through their private keys and have no associated
code, being able to send transactions. Contract accounts have associated code whose
execution can be triggered by transactions or messages. When activated, the execution
code can in turn read and write to the internal storage and send other messages (to trigger
other contracts code execution) or even create new contracts.
Transactions in Ethereum are special types of messages, which are signed by an externally
owned account. A transaction contains the recipient of the message, a signature if the
sender, the data and ether to send, as well the values STARTGAS and GASPRICE. These
last two items are used to limit the amount of computation that can be triggered by a
transaction. If a transaction runs out of gas all the computational steps executed are
reverted. The state transition associated with a transaction is represented in figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Representation of a state transition in Ethereum. From [77].
2.3.1 Ethereum Virtual Machine
All the code that runs as part of contract accounts, uses the Ethereum Virtual Machine
runtime (EVM). The EVM is sandboxed from the user system and, due to this, any code
that is running will have no access to the network or the file system, although it has access
to some information in the blockchain and can interact with other accounts through message
sending.
There are three types of memory in the EVM:
• Stack, where all the computations are performed. The maximum size is 1024 and each
word has 256 bits. Arbitrary access is limited to the top 16 elements in the stack.
• Memory, which is reset at each execution and is theoretically infinite in size - however,
due to gas costs scaling quadratically, it becomes extremely expensive to hold an
unnecessary amount of memory.
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• Storage, the only persistent type of memory. This is a key value store, where each key
and each word has a size of 256 bits.
The EVM executes a stack based bytecode, consisting of a series of bytes, each one repre-
senting an operation. A program counter is used to keep track of the current operation and
is incremented whenever an operation is performed.
Due to the properties of the EVM, its full computational state is represented by the set of
block_state, transaction, message, code, memory, stack, program_counter, gas.
It is possible for contracts to interact with other contracts or sending ether by employing
the concept of message calls. The calling contract can specify how much of its gas will be
sent and the payload. If the execution of the called contract runs out of gas, this will cause
an error to be placed in the top of the stack. The called contract may return data and its
execution is synchronous. A special type of message sending is the delegatecall - in this
case, the code of the called contract will be executed with the current context (msg.sender
and msg.value), allowing to use contracts as common software libraries.
Smart contracts are also able to perform other operations such as creating other contracts
or self destructing, consequently sending all the funds to a pre-designated address.
2.3.2 Consensus Mechanisms
As discussed in 2.2.1, Bitcoin uses Proof Of Work as its consensus mechanism. Since
Ethereum also leverages much of the technical achievements of Bitcoin, it also uses PoW as
the consensus mechanism. However, the limitations of this approach have been recognized
early in the development of Ethereum and a transition to a Proof Of Stake has been identified
as a priority.
A PoS implementation has been in development for several years, with the eventual release
suffering several delays. The current PoS mechanism roll-out date is currently estimated
between 2019 and 2021.
Along with the implementation of the new consensus approach, several scalability features are
also being implemented, such as sharding - where instead of having a single main blockchain,
there would be several ones linked together, but independent.
2.3.3 Coding for the EVM
The Ethereum Virtual Machine executes byte code for which multiple high level programming
languages were designed. A brief overview of the main programming languages for the EVM
will be given in this section, with special emphasys on Solidity.
Serpent
Serpent is object oriented programming language deeply inspired by Python, with a simple
syntax and dynamic typing. Despite its roots in a very high level language, Serpent provides
low level operations on the EVM.
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Even though it is one of the earliest languages for the EVM, its development has been
practically stalled since October 2015 [78] and significant issues were found in an audit,
mostly focused around the low code quality (lack of tests and documentation) and poor
error handling [79].
LLL
LLL, standing for Low-level Lisp-like Language is based, as its name suggests, on Lisp. It
offers low level access to the EVM, including direct access to memory and storage and direct
control over the EVM opcodes.
The low level nature of this language provides some advantages such as very small bina-
ries and highly optimized bytecode. These advantages can yield significant cost savings
depending on the contract being developed.
Mutan
Mutan is another language targeting the EVM, offering a C like syntax. Mutan is deprecated
since March 2015.
Vyper
Vyper is another language based on Python and is distinguishable from others by its lack
of some common features such as modifiers, class inheritance, function and operator over-
loading, recursion, etc. One of the main reasons for avoiding some of the constructs is the
strict requirements for security and readability.
Solidity
Solidity is the most used language for smart contract implementation. It is object oriented
and is based on C++, Python and Javascript. Solidity uses static typing and fully supports
inheritance. In this section, the structure and syntax of the language will be presented.
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.4.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t S imp l eS t o r a g e {
4 u i n t s t o r edDa ta ;
5
6 f u n c t i o n s e t ( u i n t x ) p u b l i c {
7 s t o r edDa ta = x ;
8 }
9
10 f u n c t i o n ge t ( ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( u i n t ) {




In line 1, a pragma instruction indicates that this contract should only be compiled with
version 0.4.0 to 0.6.0 (not inclusive) of the compiler.
In line 4, an unsigned integer variable storedData is declared as part of the (permanent)
storage. The contract contains two functions, get and set, that allow the caller to retrieve
and update the stored value.
The following example showcases a voting contract, a simplified version of an example
provided in [80]. In this contract, every voter is able to cast a vote in a single proposal, that
are predefined when the contract is created. Due to the advantages of the blockchain, this
contract solves one of the most important issues in the design of voting system - proving
that the result cannot be tampered.
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.4.22 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t B a l l o t {
4 s t r u c t Vote r {
5 u i n t we i gh t ; // we i gh t o f the vo t e
6 boo l vo t ed ; // i f t r ue , t h a t p e r s on a l r e a d y vo ted
7 u i n t vo t e ; // i n d e x o f the vo ted p r o p o s a l
8 }
9
10 // Th i s i s a t ype f o r a s i n g l e p r o p o s a l .
11 s t r u c t P r opo s a l {
12 by t e s32 name ; // s h o r t name ( up to 32 b y t e s )
13 u i n t voteCount ; // number o f accumu la t ed v o t e s
14 }
15
16 a d d r e s s p u b l i c c h a i r p e r s o n ;
17
18 mapping ( a d d r e s s => Vote r ) p u b l i c v o t e r s ;
19
20 Propo s a l [ ] p u b l i c p r o p o s a l s ;
21
22 c o n s t r u c t o r ( b y t e s32 [ ] memory p roposa lNames ) p u b l i c {
23 c h a i r p e r s o n = msg . s e n d e r ;
24 v o t e r s [ c h a i r p e r s o n ] . we i gh t = 1 ;
25
26 f o r ( u i n t i = 0 ; i < proposa lNames . l e n g t h ; i ++) { .
27 p r o p o s a l s . push ( P r opo s a l ({
28 name : p roposa lNames [ i ] ,
29 voteCount : 0




34 // May o n l y be c a l l e d by ‘ c h a i r p e r s o n ‘ .
35 f u n c t i o n g i v eR i gh tToVote ( a d d r e s s v o t e r ) p u b l i c {
36 r e q u i r e (
37 msg . s e n d e r == c h a i r p e r s o n ,
38 "Only c h a i r p e r s o n can g i v e r i g h t to vo t e . "
39 ) ;
40 r e q u i r e (
41 ! v o t e r s [ v o t e r ] . voted ,
42 "The v o t e r a l r e a d y vo ted . "
43 ) ;
44 v o t e r s [ v o t e r ] . we i gh t = 1 ;
45 }
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47 f u n c t i o n vo t e ( u i n t p r o p o s a l ) p u b l i c {
48 Vote r s t o r a g e s e n d e r = v o t e r s [ msg . s e n d e r ] ;
49 r e q u i r e ( s e n d e r . we i gh t != 0 , "Has no r i g h t to vo t e " ) ;
50 r e q u i r e ( ! s e n d e r . voted , " A l r e a d y vo ted . " ) ;
51 s e n d e r . vo t ed = t r u e ;
52 s e n d e r . vo t e = p r o p o s a l ;
53
54 p r o p o s a l s [ p r o p o s a l ] . voteCount += s e nd e r . we i gh t ;
55 }
56
57 f u n c t i o n w i n n i n gP r o p o s a l ( ) p u b l i c v i ew
58 r e t u r n s ( u i n t w i nn i ngP ropo sa l_ )
59 {
60 u i n t w inn ingVoteCount = 0 ;
61 f o r ( u i n t p = 0 ; p < p r o p o s a l s . l e n g t h ; p++) {
62 i f ( p r o p o s a l s [ p ] . voteCount > w inn ingVoteCount ) {
63 winn ingVoteCount = p r o p o s a l s [ p ] . voteCount ;





69 f u n c t i o n winnerName ( ) p u b l i c v i ew
70 r e t u r n s ( b y t e s32 winnerName_ )
71 {
72 winnerName_ = p r o p o s a l s [ w i n n i n gP r o p o s a l ( ) ] . name ;
73 }
74 }
As explained, this contract includes the concepts of a Voter and a Proposal, which are
defined as structs. An associative array is used to map between Ethereum addresses and
voter information. Upon the creation of the contract (and only then), the constructor
declared in line 22 is invoked, and the list of proposals is populated. A chairperson is also
defined - this corresponds to an Ethereum address that is able to give right to vote to other
addresses. This power is attributed to the Ethereum address that created the contract.
In line 35, the function for giving a right to vote is declared. This function includes a
provision to ensure that its caller is the chairperson.
The function invoked to cast a vote is declared in line 47. This function ensures that the
sender is in fact able to vote, by having a non zero weight attribute, as well as not having
already voted. The proposal for which the sender voted will have its vote count incremented.
2.4 DAO Attack
The DAO is a type of Decentralized Autonomous Organization deployed in the Ethereum
blockchain in May 2016. A Decentralized Autonomous Organization is an organization
whose processes and rules are encoded by a set of smart contracts, allowing shareholders
control through a transparent mechanism, not subjected to the regulations imposed by a
single country or governing body.
The goal of The DAO, in particular, was to allow direct venture capital funding by the
Ethereum community into projects related with this platform. Its structure follows several
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patterns of typical public traded companies, with decisions made by shareholders through
voting. Since the source code was publicly available, anyone could audit the operation of
The DAO.
Investors initially deposited funds and were given DAO tokens in return, which could be used
to vote on proposed projects. The projects that were selected for funding would receive a
certain amount of Ether, from the deposits of the investors. If those venture were successful,
the investors would receive the profits according to the terms defined in the initial proposal
for funding.
The DAO received a large amount of Ether from the Ethereum community - in May 2016,
14% of all Ether was held by The DAO. However, in June 16 2016, a bug was exploited,
which led to the loss of a large portion of these funds held in The DAO. In total, more than
$50 million dollars were stolen from the DAO - considering the relatively low Ether price
of the time. The magnitude of the attack led to a relentless search for solutions, which
eventually resulted in the proposal of a controversial hard fork to revert the attack.
This attack was possible due to a reentrancy bug in the DAO code - in simplified terms,
the DAO smart contract performed a movement of funds which included sending a message
to the sender smart contract, and only after this was performed, the actual balance of the
sender funds were updated in the DAO. Since receiving a message triggers the fallback
function in a smart contract, the sender (attacker) used this fallback function to call the
original DAO function, leading to the movement of funds to be performed multiple times
without an associated (and expected) removal of funds.
2.5 ERC-20
One of the main criticisms of design patterns, not necessarily related to those specific of
Ethereum smart contracts, is that they tend to introduce complexity in the code base. An-
other common criticism, which compounds this first observation, is that the raison d’être of
some design patterns is actually shortcomings in the targeted programming language/frame-
work.
The security and financial concerns of code that is run in the Ethereum platform make smart
contracts particularly sensitive to the correct use of design patterns, and the aforementioned
concerns are being taken into consideration by the Ethereum Core development team, to
enable a more consistent development experience.
ERC-20 is a proposal for a standard to the Ethereum platform, initially proposed in 19-11-
2015. The goal of the ERC-20 proposal was to provide a standard API for tokens in the
platform, thus guaranteeing a more consistent implementation of a common use case for
smart contracts.
The standard API consists of six methods and two events (Transfer and Approval).
1 f u n c t i o n name ( ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( s t r i n g )
2 (OPTIONAL) : Re tu rn s the name o f the token .
3
4 f u n c t i o n symbo l ( ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( s t r i n g )
5 (OPTIONAL) : Re tu rn s the symbo l o f the token .
6
7 f u n c t i o n d e c ima l s ( ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( u i n t 8 )
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8 (OPTIONAL) : Re tu rn s the number o f d e c ima l s the token u s e s .
9
10 f u n c t i o n t o t a l S u p p l y ( ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( u i n t 2 56 )
11 Retu rn s the t o t a l token s u p p l y .
12
13 f u n c t i o n ba l anceOf ( a d d r e s s _owner ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( u i n t 2 56 b a l a n c e )
14 Retu rn s the t o t a l account b a l a n c e o f an account .
15
16 f u n c t i o n t r a n s f e r ( a d d r e s s _to , u i n t 2 56 _va lue ) p u b l i c r e t u r n s ( boo l
s u c c e s s )
17 T r a n s f e r s an amount o f t o k en s to an a d d r e s s .
18
19 f u n c t i o n t r a n s f e r F r om ( a d d r e s s _from , a d d r e s s _to , u i n t 2 56 _va lue ) p u b l i c
r e t u r n s ( boo l s u c c e s s )
20 T r a n s f e r s an amount o f token from an a d d r e s s to ano t h e r . Th i s i s used i n
an w i t h d r awa l wo rk f l ow .
21
22 f u n c t i o n app rove ( a d d r e s s _spender , u i n t 2 56 _va lue ) p u b l i c r e t u r n s ( boo l
s u c c e s s )
23 A l l ow s an a d d r e s s to w i thd raw from an account .
24
25 f u n c t i o n a l l ow a n c e ( a d d r e s s _owner , a d d r e s s _spender ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s
( u i n t 2 56 r ema i n i n g )
26 Retu rn s the amount o f t o k en s o f wh ich an a d d r e s s can s t i l l w i thd raw from




Value analysis is a fundamental tool to comprehend the impact of blockchain based appli-
cations and, in particular, how the development and systematization of design patterns can
bring value to the customers. In this chapter, this value analysis will be presented, with
emphasis on the concepts of value, perceived value and customer value.
As reviewed in chapter 2, the emergence of Bitcoin (and, in particular its innovative technical
solution, the blockchain) revolutionized the concepts of online transactions by avoiding the
need for a trusted peer to mediate these transactions. The incremental developments that
originated other projects, such as the Ethereum framework, expanded on that application to
enable full Turing-complete smart contracts, which can be enforced also without requiring
a third party - other than the miners, for which the economic incentives makes the prospect
of collusion for sabotaging the participants an irrational decision.
Even if the design of the blockchain provides some safeguards against exploitation, the same
is not true for faults in the smart contracts code - these faults can be exploited in what
is called an incentive compatible fashion (profitably), thus harming the interested parties in
those contracts. The appropriate employment of design patterns can enable a more robust
implementation of those contracts, thus avoiding possible attacks and inefficient execution
resulting in high gas expenditure.
As proposed in [81], value can be defined as "need, desire, interest, standard criteria, beliefs,
attitudes, and preferences".
The costumer for this solution are the Ethereum software developers and the users of the
smart contracts, since these groups can derive value from a solution that enables more
robust and efficient contracts.
3.1 Perceived value
The concept of perceived value is related to the user assessment of the utility of a product,
based on the perception of what he receives and gives [82].
One of the goals of this dissertation is a smart contract which showcases the employment
of multiple design patterns to achieve the goals related with security, upgradeability, user
trust and transparency. This can be analysed as the "product" - the following advantages
are granted:
Improved security Ethereum, which serves as the platform for the smart contracts that
will be studied in this work, offers, by design, solid guarantees on the security of
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transactions on this platform: in order to be considered valid, there has to be a wide
agreement by the mining nodes; after approval, the transaction is forever stored in
the Ethereum blockchain, on widely distributed nodes, and cryptographically linked to
other subsequent transactions. Having established the security features provided by
the Ethereum framework, the other remaining source of security issues is application
bugs/failures. This will be addressed by appropriate use of smart contracts that will
help to mitigate any potential bug in the developed smart contracts.
Enhanced Transparency due to the distributed nature of Ethereum, transaction informa-
tion is distributed among a very large number of nodes. This characteristic enables a
greater transparency than in traditional systems, reliant on a central authority to keep
track of this same information - all the participants are able to fully consult the details
of the transactions in the system.
Immutability once a transaction is commited to the Ethereum blockchain and the block
is agreed upon a majority of nodes, the transaction is effectively immutable - while
theoretically it is possible to revert it, the amount of resources that would need to be
allocated for that endeavor should surpass the ones entire computational power of the
current Ethereum network. Furthermore, the greater the amount of time passed since
the transaction acceptance, the harder it will be to revert it.
Low Costs the removal of intermediaries/middleman from the process of mediating trans-
actions, causes fees and overhead to be reduced which results in potential lower costs.
Some caveats should be made in relation to this topic: transaction fees (in the form
of gas) may be substantial, depending on the Ether value in the market and other
factors that affect the mining economy. An eventual transition to a more efficient
consensus method than Proof Of Work (such as Proof Of Stake) may alleviate this
issue significantly.
A smart contract can be analysed as essentially providing a service. The characteristics of
these services developed in the blockchain offer their own suite of strengths:
Always on Since the Ethereum framework supports the smart contracts, the service pro-
vided by these contracts is, by definition, always available - issues such as server
downtime and deprecation/loss of support (unless it is intentional) are not concerns.
Reliable by employing the power of robust design patterns to their best effect, a robust
solution is achieved.
Extensively Tested the service will feature extensive automated testing, which will allow
increasing the user confidence.
Open Sourced by open sourcing the smart contract, the previous points are reinforced:
user confidence in the contract can be backed by their own analysis of the source code
or, alternatively, by analysis of reputed third parties.
The relationship between the user and developing party is also relevant for analysing perceived
value. The following attributes can be identified:
Transparency by relying on the blockchain, all the concerns related with the service are fully
auditable: the transactions that are processed, the business logic that handles those
transactions and the parties that have administrative control (if any).
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Anonymity while transactions in the blockchain are publicly available for anyone to check,
the transaction trail only reveals Ethereum addresses, which can not be linked to
anyone in particular and are randomised, since they are generated by cryptographic
algorithms. No one except the owner of the addresses (and their funds) could identify
a person by analysing the blockchain.
Security by employing well researched patterns, the user can be safe in using the developed
contract.
Trustless no central authority (nor the developer) will be able to interfere with the contract
logic, so not trust needs to be put on the developer nor any other third party.
Despite the large benefits identified in the last sections, some sacrifices are also present and
worthy of consideration. These are:
High variability in Ether value while transactions costs are tendentiously low, and a con-
tract may not be necessarily handling financial transactions, gas is still paid in Ether,
whose underlying value (as measured against traditional currencies) is wildly volatile.
This concern can be partly addressed (and with some cost) by hedging the held Ether
against a currency such as USD, using available contracts in the Ethereum ecosystem
for this end.
Technical Nature the technical nature of smart contracts limits the User Experience and,
despite the proliferation of tools that foster adoption by less technically savvy users,
some roadblocks still exist and some benefits are limited for this class of users.
Limited Scope due to the ambitious scientific goals of this work, the developed smart
contract may have a limited feature scope, which could fail to provide enough value
to attract users.
3.2 Fuzzy Front End, New Product Development (NPD) and
Commercialization
As proposed by [83], the innovation process can be divided into three distinctive segments:
fuzzy front end (FFE), new product development (NPD) and commercialization.
This is represented in figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Representation of the three phases of the innovation process.
The differences between the fuzzy front end and new product development processes can
be difficult to pinpoint. In table 3.1, these differences are summarized. In a basic definition,
the FFE comprehends less formal activities, with a high focus on experimental work and
unpredictable commercialization potential.
Table 3.1: Comparison between Fuzzy Front End and New Product Devel-
opment phases.
Topic FFE NPD








Funding Highly unpredictable Well modelled in a project plan
3.2.1 New Concept Development Model
The New Concept Development Model (NCD) supports the Fuzzy Front End phase of the
innovation process, by providing nomenclature for defining the key components of the FFE.
An overview of this model is represented in figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Representation of the New Concept Development Model.
A brief explanation of the model:
Engine the engine represents support by management and the organization where the
project takes place.
Influencing Factors influencing factors can be be varied in nature, but they are typically
associated with uncontrollable factors, such as the business environment and
Five Elements
The Five Elements of the Front End of Innovation are explained in more depth below:
Opportunity Identification in this element, opportunities that the organization wants to
pursue are identified. There are several techniques that can be used to nurture the
identification of new opportunities. These include ad hoc sessions, informal workplace
discussions, individual contributions, etc.
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Opportunity Analysis an opportunity is studied with the goal of understanding if it is worth-
while to pursue it. This involves research to guide the final decision. Techniques for
these element include focus groups, market studies and scientific studies.
Idea Genesis this element is related with the birth, development and maturation of an idea.
This process is intrinsically iterative and includes the involves direct contact with the
customers and other stakeholders. Techniques for this activity include, for instance,
brainstorming sessions.
Idea Selection selecting the appropriate ideas is a crucial endeavor. Formal decision making
processes are generally difficult to employ due to the limited information available on
the early stages of the innovation process.
Concept and Technology Development this is the final element, and comprehends the
exit to the next stages of the innovation process - the New Product Development.
The application of the five elements to this work:
Opportunity Identification the existence of high profile exploits to Ethereum Smart Con-
tracts, such as the DAO attack, as well as the environmental and economic conse-
quences of ineffective Smart Contracts constitute an excellent opportunity.
Opportunity Analysis an analysis of the causes of most of the exploits points to bad soft-
ware engineering practices and, often, to wrong use of design patterns.
Idea Genesis in order to promote the development of the Smart Contract ecosystem in
Ethereum, currently valued in the tenths of billions of dollars, the adoption of better
software development practices is fundamental. An alternative solution is to just bypass
decentralized solutions and rely on traditional trust based transactions.
Idea Selection to improve upon the current standards in blockchain based software engi-
neering is the favored approach. The most important factor for this decision is the
great benefits that are uncovered by avoiding trusted middleman for peer to peer
transaction and contracts.
Concept and Techonology Development comprehends the work to be developed in the
context of this dissertation.
3.3 Choosing a Smart Contract Framework
In the early stages of this work, one of the main decisions to carry out was the choice of
the Smart Contract framework to use. The choice is not simple, as it depends on multiple
factors. Furthermore, this decision will have important implications in the work to be done.
Formal methods exist for decision making, which can be employed for this task. Analytic
Hierarchy Process is one of such methods: this method admits the division of the decision
problem in hierarchical levels, and allows the use of both quantitative and qualitative metrics
in the evaluation process.
To use this method, the following phases should be followed:
1. Define the problem and structure it as an hierarchical diagram. This hierarchy should
include, at least, an objective, criteria and alternatives.
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2. Compare the alternatives and criteria, establishing priorities, by using a comparison
matrix.
3. Obtain the relative priority of each criteria. From the priority of each alternative,
relative to the different criteria, normalize these values and obtain the priority vector
- by calculating the arithmetic mean of the values in each of normalized matrix rows.
The following criteria were identified as being meaningful for deciding on a framework:
Market Capitalization market capitalization can be used as a proxy for interest and poten-
tial of the framework.
Decentralization while all frameworks allow a degree of decentralization, some technical
concerns could lead to different degrees of decentralization.
Transactions Per Second the maximum value of Transactions Per Second (TPS) that are
capable of being processed is fundamental to understand the scalability of the solution.
A very low TPS places a hard cap on the potential of a framework, especially if no
solutions are envisioned for surpassing the limitation.
Smart Contract Features the capability associated with a smart contract - a framework
that provides more features would enable more powerful smart contracts, which in turn
could allow the development of applications for intricate use cases.




The hierarchical diagram is represented in figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: AHP hierarchic diagram.
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3.3.1 Pairwise Comparisons
Having established the alternatives and the criteria, the next step is to perform pairwise
comparisons between the alternatives, for each criteria.
Market Capitalization
Currently, by analysing the market capitalization of the alternatives, it is clear that Bitcoin
has the highest, with around $70 billion dollars. Ethereum has around $15.5 billion dollars
and EOS has $3.5 billion dollars of market capitalization.
The pairwise comparison for the different alternatives, and respective weights matrix, are
shown in tables 3.2 and 3.3.
Table 3.2: Pairwise comparison of alternatives with respect to the Market
Capitalization criteria.
Pairwise Comparison for Market Capitalization
Bitcoin 5 Ethereum 1
Bitcoin 9 EOS 1
Ethereum 5 EOS 1
Table 3.3: Weights matrix for the Market capitalization criteria.
Market Capitalization Bitcoin Ethereum EOS
Bitcoin 1 5 9
Ethereum 1/5 1 5
EOS 1/9 1/5 1
Decentralization
The analysis for decentralization is relative to the publicly deployed networks of Bitcoin,
Ethereum and EOS. All of them allow anyone to join, but technical aspects create some
limitations to the decentralization.
In the case of Bitcoin, the type of algorithm used for the proof of work (SHA-256) strongly
favors the use of specialized hardware - Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) -
that are orders of magnitude more effective than CPUs at this task. Since it is not expected
that normal users will have access to this type of hardware, it creates some centralization in
the mining power, which could make it easier to exploit for a 51% attack.
EOS uses a Delegated Proof Of Stake approach for its consensus mechanism. Each token
holder will vote for a set of validators - a total of 21 will be chosen and these validators will
be able to produce new blockchain blocks. Since only 21 validators do exist, collusion is a
more threatening possibility in this framework.
Ethereum uses a hashing algorithm that is memory intensive (KECCAK-256), with the
declared purpose of mitigating the use of specialized hardware. Its consensus is also proof
of work, as with Bitcoin - this helps achieve a high degree of decentralization.
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The pairwise comparison for the different alternatives, and respective weights matrix, are
shown in tables 3.4 and 3.5.
Table 3.4: Pairwise comparison of alternatives with respect to the decentral-
ization criteria.
Pairwise Comparison for Decentralization
Bitcoin 1 Ethereum 3
Bitcoin 5 EOS 1
Ethereum 7 EOS 1
Table 3.5: Weights matrix for the Decentralization criteria.
Decentralization Bitcoin Ethereum EOS
Bitcoin 1 1/3 5
Ethereum 3 1 7
EOS 1/5 1/7 1
Transactions Per Second
In relations to transactions per second, Bitcoin has a maximum of around 7 - this is related
with the low frequency of block creation and the maximum size of each block (1 megabyte).
Ethereum has a maximum transaction rate of around 15 transactions per second. EOS, by
virtue of using a Delegated Proof Of Stake consensus mechanism, is able to achieve much
higher transaction rates - sustained operation is possible in the thousands per second, and
peaks were registered for TPS above 13000.
The pairwise comparison for the different alternatives, and respective weights matrix, are
shown in tables 3.6 and 3.7.
Table 3.6: Pairwise comparison of alternatives with respect to the Transac-
tion Per Second (TPS) criteria.
Pairwise Comparison for TPS
Bitcoin 1 Ethereum 3
Bitcoin 1 EOS 9
Ethereum 1 EOS 9
Table 3.7: Weights matrix for the Transaction Per Second (TPS) criteria.
TPS Bitcoin Ethereum EOS
Bitcoin 1 1/3 1/9
Ethereum 3 1 1/9
EOS 9 9 1
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Smart Contract Features
The Bitcoin ecosystem, being developed primarily as a currency, offers a low number of
features in respect to possible contracts being developed - the Turing Incomplete nature of
the scripting that is possible to use in Bitcoin leads to very limited capabilities.
Ethereum and EOS both offer a Turing complete platform for smart contract deployment.
EOS contracts are developed in C++ while Ethereum has several languages that can be
used, with a comprehensive range of features.
The pairwise comparison for the different alternatives, and respective weights matrix, are
shown in tables 3.8 and 3.9.
Table 3.8: Pairwise comparison of alternatives with respect to the Smart
Contract Features criteria.
Pairwise Comparison for Features
Bitcoin 1 Ethereum 9
Bitcoin 1 EOS 7
Ethereum 3 EOS 1
Table 3.9: Weights matrix for the Smart Contract Features criteria.
Features Bitcoin Ethereum EOS
Bitcoin 1 1/9 1/7
Ethereum 9 1 3
EOS 7 1/3 1
Results
By using the results of the pairwise comparisons between the different alternatives, it is
possible to make a decision.
The weights matrix for the different criteria are represented in table 3.10.
Table 3.10: Weights matrix for the criteria.
Market Capitalization Decentralization Transactions Per Second Features
Market Capitalization 1 1/2 1 2
Decentralization 2 1 2 1
Transactions Per Second 1 1/2 1 1/3
Features 2 1 3 1
The final result is represented in figure 3.4 - Ethereum reached the highest score, 45.9%,
with Bitcoin score set at 30.2% and EOS score at 23.9%.
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In the realm of software engineering, design patterns are defined as generic and reusable
solutions to common problems in software design. In this context, the work presented in [84]
was particularly influential, introducing patterns such as the Iterator, the Abstract Factory,
the Strategy, the Builder, the Singleton, etc. The work in [84] allowed to systematise the
knowledge surrounding those design patterns - most of them were already being used at the
time of publication, but by identifying the patterns by name, and by framing those design
patterns in a problem / solution dichotomy, this work enabled the dissemination of their use,
as well as facilitating communication in the cases involving the use of those patterns.
In this chapter, an analysis of some common design patterns for developing smart contracts
in Ethereum is presented. In table 4.1, a summary of the different properties of those design
patterns is represented.
Table 4.1: Overview of several design patterns.
Design Pat-
tern
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Table 4.1: Overview of several design patterns.
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Table 4.1: Overview of several design patterns.
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Table 4.1: Overview of several design patterns.
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4.1 Checks Effects Interaction
4.1.1 Intent
Avoid the possibility of a called contract changing the state of the caller.
4.1.2 Motivation
Contracts in Ethereum can invoke other contracts, and send them funds. As a side effect,
when a third party contract is called, the control of the execution is handed over to that
contract. This contract, then in charge of the control flow, is able to execute any logic,
including calling any other contract in the blockchain. This opens the possibility to perform
a so called reentrancy attack, where the caller calls back the first contract. This can lead
to undesired effects on the contract and change of state, all of this before the the first
invocation is finished. For instance, by re-executing methods that are supposed to be called
in a certain order and/or only once, the state of the original contract can be changed in
ways that could create an advantage to the third party contract.
4.1.3 Applicability
This pattern can be used for the following cases:
• Protect a contract against reentrancy attacks.
• Avoiding calling a third party contract is difficult or not possible.
4.1.4 Participants
There are two participants in this pattern: the target contract (the one where the design
pattern should be applied) and the caller (third party) contract.
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Figure 4.1: Sequence Diagram for Checks Effects Interaction design pattern.
4.1.5 Consequences
Implementing this pattern on a smart contract does not generally entail an overhead in terms
of gas costs. However, it should be noted that the style of programming can be counter
intuitive to programmers from a traditional background, where effects are generally only
applied once the interaction occurs.
While sometimes implementing this pattern can be achieved by only altering the order of
the code, it may also not be possible to achieve the desired effects in this way. It may
also happen that using Checks Effects Interaction at the function level is not enough, as if
the targeted function precedes other state changes, the contract may still be susceptible to
reentrancy attacks. Other patterns, such as Mutex and Pull payment may be used for these
cases.
4.1.6 Sample Code
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t C h e c k s E f f e c t s I n t e r a c t i o n {
4
5 a d d r e s s p u b l i c owner = msg . s e n d e r ;
6 u i n t 2 56 p u b l i c b a l a n c e = 0 ;
7
8 f u n c t i o n w i thd raw ( u i n t 2 56 amountToWithdraw ) p u b l i c {
9 // Checks
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10 r e q u i r e (msg . s e n d e r == owner , " Th i s o p e r a t i o n can o n l y be
pe r f o rmed by the owner " ) ;
11 r e q u i r e ( b a l a n c e >= amountToWithdraw , "Amount to w i thd raw i s
g r e a t e r than the a v a i l a b l e b a l a n c e " ) ;
12
13 // E f f e c t s
14 b a l a n c e −= amountToWithdraw ;
15
16 // I n t e r a c t i o n
17 msg . s e n d e r . t r a n s f e r ( amountToWithdraw ) ;
18 }
19
20 f u n c t i o n d e p o s i t ( ) p u b l i c p a y a b l e {




This pattern is widely used in several smart contracts. An example is the CriptoCountries
contract 1. This contract allows its users to "buy" countries in the world map, by doubling
the current amount paid for each owner. The function buy() showcases the use of this
pattern - all checks, logic and state changes occur prior to the transfer of Ether to the
previous owner account - this transfer of Ether could pass the control of the flow to the
called address, if it is a contract.
A notable lack of use of this pattern occurred in the DAO smart contract, whose attack is
described in section 2.4.
4.1.8 Related Patterns
There are some patterns that can be used to address shortcomings of the Checks Effects In-
teraction pattern. Mutex (analysed in section 4.11) is a pattern that, when used, guarantees
that reentrancy can not occur (or limit it, if designed to do so). Pull payment (analysed in
section 4.6) is another pattern that can limit the attack surface by avoiding transferring the
control flow to a third party contract when transferring funds. Instead, these funds would
be assigned to the beneficiary, in the original contract and that entity should then proceed
to withdraw them in a separate transaction.
4.2 Emergency Stop
4.2.1 Intent
Allow disabling contract functionality in case of an emergency.
1https://etherscan.io/address/0x17df117bb806a622d841bd5166a23b5d8746232f/#code
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4.2.2 Also Known As
Circuit breaker.
4.2.3 Motivation
Deploying a smart contract to the main Ethereum network should only occur after extensive
auditing to ensure that eventual bugs are not deployed, causing loss of users (or own) funds
and loss of trust. However, given the evidence that bugs may still occur even with a large
amount of resources and time dedicated to testing, steps should be taken to attenuate the
effects of eventual flaws that are discovered. In the case of Ethereum, a quick fix to a smart
contract is often impossible due to the inherent immutability of the smart contract code.
Using the Emergency Stop pattern, it is possible to pause the execution of critical flows of
the smart contract, thus preventing possible exploits of a flaw affecting this critical flow.
4.2.4 Applicability
The following cases are suitable for the application of the pattern:
• ability to temporarily or indefinitely stop the execution of a smart contract.
• protect critical flows against possible exploits.
4.2.5 Participants
There are three participants that can be identified in this pattern. One of those is the
contract where the pattern is applied (target contract), and whose functions should or should
not be active depending on its state. The second are the regular users of the contract, which
can use all the non administrative functionalities of the contract. The third entity is the
administrator of the contract, which can trigger the emergency stop and also resume the
contract.
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Figure 4.2: Sequence Diagram for Emergency Stop design pattern.
4.2.6 Consequences
While the emergency stop pattern offers an easy, reliable method of protecting against
unforeseen faults in the contract code, it also adds a degree of unpredictability due to the
fact that users need to trust the intents of the administrator - a malicious administrator
could use this pattern to ransom the funds of the users. Given the trustless nature of the
blockchain, requiring trust could be constructed as something to avoid.
The emergency stop pattern adds a negligible cost to the execution of the functions of a
contract - the cost of checking the value of a state variable.
4.2.7 Sample Code
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t EmergencyStop {
4
5 a d d r e s s p u b l i c owner = msg . s e n d e r ;
6 boo l i s S t o p p e d = f a l s e ;
7
8 m o d i f i e r notStopped {
9 r e q u i r e ( ! i sS topped , "Smart c o n t r a c t o p e r a t i o n s a r e s topped " ) ;
10 _;
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11 }
12
13 m o d i f i e r on lyWhenStopped {




18 m o d i f i e r on lyOwner {
19 r e q u i r e (msg . s e n d e r == owner , " Th i s o p e r a t i o n can o n l y be




23 f u n c t i o n s t o pCon t r a c t ( ) p u b l i c on lyOwner {
24 i s S t o p p e d = t r u e ;
25 emi t Con t r a c t I s S t o p p e d ( ) ;
26 }
27
28 f u n c t i o n r e sumeCont r ac t ( ) p u b l i c on lyOwner {
29 i s S t o p p e d = f a l s e ;
30 emi t Cont rac t I sResumed ( ) ;
31 }
32
33 f u n c t i o n pe r f o rmNorma lOpe r a t i on ( ) p u b l i c p a y a b l e notStopped r e t u r n s
( boo l ) {
34 // pe r f o rm o p e r a t i o n l o g i c
35 r e t u r n t r u e ;
36 }
37
38 f u n c t i o n eme rgencyOpe ra t i on ( ) p u b l i c on lyWhenStopped {
39 // Emergency o p e r a t i o n
40 }
41
42 e v en t Con t r a c t I s S t o p p e d ( ) ;
43 e v en t Cont r ac t I sResumed ( ) ;
44 }
4.2.8 Known Uses
The Emergency Stop pattern is implemented as part of the OpenZeppelin library 2, which
offers several contracts that can be used to implement Ethereum standards and other general
safe, audited snippets of code. The specific contract that implements this pattern is the
Pausable contract and it is often used in deployed smart contracts.
One example is the OmiseGO contract 3, which aims to enable financial inclusion by providing
bank-like services. This contract includes the Pausable implementation, and uses this pattern
by having contracts extending Pausable.
2https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts
3https://omisego.co/
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4.2.9 Related Patterns
The aim of the Emergency Stop is to provide a temporary safeguard against revealed faults.
Since deployed contracts are immutable, in order to address these faults, it is often necessary
to also implement some mechanism to allow upgradeability. A popular approach to achieve
this is to employ the Contract Relay pattern, discussed in section 4.10.
4.3 Speed Bump
4.3.1 Intent
To delay the execution of important operations.
4.3.2 Motivation
Any operation performed in the blockchain is effectively irreversible and immutable. This
is an important design decision for Ethereum, as it possibilities the existence of contracts
between two entities that do not necessarily trust each other - without this guarantee, one
of the parties could reverse any operation such as transfer of funds, voiding the guarantees
of the contract.
While this characteristic is an important feature of Ethereum, it brings some potential prob-
lems. For instance, an attacker that manages to transfer funds to one of his accounts,
leaves the victims without recourse, since its actions will be irreversible and the Ethereum
framework does not incorporate tools such as blacklisting of accounts.
The Speed Bump pattern dictates that high value operations should only be effective after
a certain "cool down" period, thus allowing reaction in case of an attack.
4.3.3 Applicability
This pattern can be used when:
• High value operations are allowed in a contract.
• High contract complexity may cause unexpected uses of certain operations.
4.3.4 Participants
There are two participating entities in this contract: the user and the target contract, which
implements this pattern. The user initiates the interaction by requesting a certain operation
to be performed. This order for the operation execution will then be stored. The user
can then request the execution of the operation. If the pre-determined amount of time is
elapsed, his requests will be fulfilled, otherwise they will fail.
4.3. Speed Bump 43
Figure 4.3: Sequence Diagram for Speed Bump design pattern.
4.3.5 Consequences
As a consequence of the employment of this pattern, the operations affected will be inten-
tionally delayed. While the purpose of this delay may be justified by security requirements, it
will also negatively affect user experience. In fact, the user will have to wait for an otherwise
immediate operation. Also, for the operation to be performed, the user will need to initiate
two transactions.
4.3.6 Sample Code
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t SpeedBump {
4
5 s t r u c t Request {
6 u i n t t ime ;
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7 }
8
9 mapping ( a d d r e s s => Request ) p r i v a t e r e q u e s t e dOp e r a t i o n s ;
10 u i n t c o n s t a n t w i t h d r awa lWa i tP e r i o d = 7 days ;
11
12 f u n c t i o n r e q u e s tOp e r a t i o n ( ) p u b l i c {
13 r e q u e s t e dOp e r a t i o n s [ msg . s e n d e r ] = Request ({
14 t ime : now
15 }) ;
16 emi t Reque s t edOpe r a t i o n (msg . s e n d e r ) ;
17 }
18
19 f u n c t i o n p e r f o rmOpe r a t i o n ( ) p u b l i c {
20 i f ( now > ( r e q u e s t e dOp e r a t i o n s [ msg . s e n d e r ] . t ime +
w i t h d r awa lWa i tP e r i o d ) ) {
21 d e l e t e r e q u e s t e dOp e r a t i o n s [ msg . s e n d e r ] ;




26 e v en t Reque s t edOpe r a t i o n ( a d d r e s s add r ) ;
27 e v en t Pe r f o rmedOpe ra t i on ( a d d r e s s add r ) ;
28 }
4.3.7 Known Uses
The Speed Bump pattern was used in The DAO contract, well known for the attack it
suffered (detailed in section 2.4). This contract required 27 days between a request for
splitting the DAO and the effective performance of this operation. While this pattern was
successfully implemented in The DAO, no provisions were made to allow to reverse the
operation. As such, the attack was successful.
4.3.8 Related Patterns
In order to effectively halt attacks using this pattern, mechanisms should be in place to
revert exploitative operations. One of the approaches to achieve this is the Emergency Stop
pattern (analysed in section 4.2).
4.4 Rate Limit
4.4.1 Intent
Limit the amount of times an operation can be called in a specific time frame.
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4.4.2 Motivation
A large number of requests in a smart contract may adversely affect its operational perfor-
mance: a common case is when a large number of withdrawals are requested in a short time
frame. The Rate Limit pattern applies, as the name suggests, a limitation to the number
of invocations that a certain function receives in a specific time frame.
4.4.3 Applicability
This pattern can be used when:
• Operational requirements concern the rate of requests that certain (or all) functions
receive.
4.4.4 Participants
There are two participants in this contract: the caller and the contract which exposes
operations that are rate limited (target contract). The caller will initiate a transaction
which will be executed by the smart contract. If a new transaction is required in an time
period less than the stipulated by the rate limiting feature, the request will be denied.
Figure 4.4: Sequence Diagram for Rate Limit design pattern.
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4.4.5 Consequences
As a result of implementing the Rate Limit pattern, certain operations will be throttled,
requiring a "cooling off" period. While this is useful for guaranteeing some operational
requirements of the smart contract, it has negative effects in the user experience, since the
user will need to wait for a certain period of time before executing the desired operation.
4.4.6 Sample Code
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t Ra teL im i tByUse r {
4
5 mapping ( a d d r e s s => u i n t ) enab l e dAt ;
6
7 m o d i f i e r a l l owOpe r a t i o nByUs e rE v e r y ( u i n t t , a d d r e s s add r ) {
8 i f ( now >= enab l e dAt [ add r ] ) {





14 f u n c t i o n r a t e L im i t e dOp e r a t i o n ( ) p u b l i c a l l owOpe r a t i o nByUs e rE v e r y (30
minutes , msg . s e n d e r ) {
15 // do someth i ng
16 emi t Pe r f o rmedOpe r a t i on ( ) ;
17 }
18
19 e v en t Pe r f o rmedOpe ra t i on ( ) ;
20 }
4.4.7 Known Uses
An example of the usage of the Rate Limit pattern can be verified in the Etherep project
4. The Etherep offers a crowdsourced reputation system for the Ethereum platform. In line
70, the modifier delay() implements the rate limiting behaviour.
4.4.8 Related Patterns
Another pattern that can be used for dealing with serious operational abnormalities is the
Emergency Stop, detailed in section 4.2.
4https://github.com/gointollc/etherep-contracts/blob/master/contracts/etherep.sol
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4.5 Balance Limit
4.5.1 Intent
Manage smart contract risk by limiting the potentially exposed funds.
4.5.2 Motivation
When developing smart contracts, an universal concern is that large amounts of Ether in a
contract can pose liability issues. This is compounded for cases where the developed code
is not thoroughly tested.
The Balance Limit pattern can be used for these situations: this pattern proposes the
implementation of mechanism to impose a maximum limit for the total balance that an
account can hold. Before any deposit operation is performed, a check on the total balance
is performed, rejecting new deposits if the current balance exceeds the threshold.
4.5.3 Applicability
The Balance Limit pattern can be used when:
• Developing alpha/beta versions of a contract.
4.5.4 Participants
There are two participant entities in this pattern: the user and the smart contract where the
pattern is implemented. The user tries to deposit a certain amount of Ether in the smart
contract. Internally, the contract checks if the limit would be surpassed if the deposit is
accepted - in case it is, the deposit is denied.
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Figure 4.5: Sequence Diagram for Balance Limit design pattern.
4.5.5 Consequences
The Balance Limit pattern provides an effective and simple to implement mechanism to limit
the liability in case a contract as critical flaws. However, it introduces a major constraint in
the usability of these type of contracts, as they will have, by design, limited scalability.
4.5.6 Sample Code
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t Ba l a n c eL im i t {
4 u i n t 2 56 p u b l i c l i m i t = 5000 we i ;
5
6 m o d i f i e r l i m i t e d B a l a n c e ( ) {
7 r e q u i r e ( a d d r e s s ( t h i s ) . b a l a n c e + msg . v a l u e <= l i m i t , " Con t r a c t




11 f u n c t i o n d e p o s i t ( ) p u b l i c p a y a b l e l i m i t e d B a l a n c e {
12 // do s t u f f
13 }
14 }
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4.6 Pull Payment
4.6.1 Intent
Decrease the risk associated with processing Ether transactions.
4.6.2 Also Known As
Pull over Push.
4.6.3 Motivation
Any Ether transaction from address to another requires a call to the receiving contract -
this involves loosing the control over the flow of the execution, as discussed in 4.1.
Since the logic of the receiving contract is completely out of control for the caller, this
poses some dangers: for instance, the receiving function may always throw an exception,
thus causing the operation on the caller to always fail and any state changes to be reverted.
While in most cases, intentionally causing an error when receiving Ether would negatively
impact the receiver, this could also be used to freeze critical functionality in the contract.
Another potential issue is when a contract performs multiple transfers in the same transaction
- any single failed transaction would cause all others to be reverted.
The pull payment patterns allows to address these issues, by isolating each external call
from each other and also from the remaining state changing logic. Employing this pattern,
successful execution of the contract logic can be effectively decoupled potentially failing calls
to external entities.
4.6.4 Applicability
This pattern can be used for the following cases:
• avoiding the risk that ether transactions entails.
• safeguard critical flows that are prone to be abused by a malicious entity.
4.6.5 Participants
This pattern has three directly involved entities. One entity is the initial caller to the smart
contract - the result of this call is that the contract (second entity) will update the currently
owed balances so that a receiver will be able to trigger a payment to its address. This
receiver will then initiate a second transaction, where it will request withdrawal of his funds.
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Figure 4.6: Sequence Diagram for Pull Payment design pattern.
4.6.6 Consequences
While the Pull Payment pattern offers significant safety advantages when transferring Ether
in the context of a smart contract, it also brings some disadvantages that should be consid-
ered. The main disadvantage is related with the effect of this pattern on the user experience
- the user needs to perform two transactions to withdraw their funds, which can be cumber-
some, particularly for some type of contracts. This complexity is sometimes verified in the
form of users not ever withdrawing their balances, reflecting the unintuitive nature of the
user experience.
Another disadvantage is related with gas costs. Since the user needs to submit two transac-
tions, gas costs are significantly higher than the alternative of only using a single transaction
to perform the logic and the Ether transfer.
4.6.7 Sample Code
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t Pu l lPayment {
4 mapping ( a d d r e s s => u i n t ) r e f u n d s ;
5
6 f u n c t i o n putPayment ( ) p u b l i c p a y a b l e {
7 r e f u n d s [ msg . s e n d e r ] += msg . v a l u e ;
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8 emi t PutPayment (msg . s e n d e r ) ;
9 }
10
11 f u n c t i o n pu l lPaymen t ( ) p u b l i c {
12 u i n t r e f u n d = r e f u n d s [ msg . s e n d e r ] ;
13 r e f u n d s [ msg . s e n d e r ] = 0 ;
14 msg . s e n d e r . t r a n s f e r ( r e f u n d ) ;
15 emi t PaymentPu l l ed (msg . s e n d e r ) ;
16 }
17
18 e v en t PutPayment ( a d d r e s s t a r g e t ) ;
19 e v en t PaymentPu l l ed ( a d d r e s s t a r g e t ) ;
20 }
4.6.8 Known Uses
An example of the usage of the Pull Payment pattern can be verified in the BlockPart
contract 5. BlockParty is a smart contract where users are expected to deposit a certain
amount of Ether to reserve their place to attend a certain event. If the user ends up
attending said event, its deposit is returned, otherwise, it is kept by the host.
In line 133 of the contract, the withdraw() function displays an example of this pattern.
After performing some checks, the user deposit is sent back to him.
4.7 Oracle
4.7.1 Intent
Fetch information not otherwise accessible from the blockchain.
4.7.2 Motivation
The Ethereum Virtual Machine offers only a sandboxed environment in which computations
are run. The implications of this is that several operations usually available to general
computation are not possible in the Ethereum platform - namely those operations that require
internet connectivity. There are several reasons for this design decision, one of which is the
fact that data outside the blockchain does not offer the immutability guarantees necessary
for the consensus mechanism to be employed.
Given these constraints, any data that needs to be made accessible to the blockchain should
be provided directly, by means of a transaction, and stored in state variables. This data can
then be accessed by other contracts or functionality on the platform.
External data is required for several relevant use cases, such as financial contracts, sports
gambling, weather based applications, etc. An oracle acts as a bridge between the blockchain
and the outside world, providing authenticated data for other contracts to rely on.
5https://github.com/makoto/blockparty/blob/master/contracts/Conference.sol
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4.7.3 Applicability
The following cases are suitable for the application of the pattern:
• information outside the blockchain is required.
• the oracle can be considered as a trusted source.
4.7.4 Participants
There are three participants in this pattern. A contract that acts as a requester for infor-
mation, the oracle and a data source entity that provides the data - the data source entity
is external to the blockchain.
The requester starts by calling the oracle with a set of criteria for the information to be
accessed. The oracle contract can work in various ways. In a simple implementation, it may
already contain the information that the requester asked for and, in this case, it will relay
this information to the requester - in this case, the data source entity should proactively
insert the data in the contract. In another possible implementation, the oracle will actually
not respond with the information immediately, instead creating a trigger for the data source
to provide the information - this trigger will not be part of the blockchain operations. A
callback will then be invoked on the requester, providing the required information.
Figure 4.7: Sequence Diagram for Oracle design pattern.
4.7.5 Consequences
The use of the Oracle pattern offers an easy to use mechanism to provide outside data to
smart contracts. However, relying on an Oracle smart contract introduces several risks. Any
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user interacting with the requester contract would need to trust the accuracy of the oracle,
thus introducing a "trust" requirement that is often frowned upon on the community.
An approach to deal with the requirement of trust is to use several independent oracles to
provide the necessary data, employing an arbitration strategy to deal with incongruent data
between them. A simple strategy could be to employ a voting scheme on the provided data,
choosing the result with most votes. Alternatively, more complex approaches could include
statistical analysis of the results. However, incrementing the amount of oracles used will
also increase the gas costs associated with the contract operation.
4.7.6 Sample Code
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t Weathe rOrac l e {
4 a d d r e s s owner = msg . s e n d e r ;
5 i n t c u r r e n tTempe r a t u r e ;
6 boo l i s R a i n i n g ;
7
8 m o d i f i e r on lyOwner {
9 r e q u i r e (msg . s e n d e r == owner , " Th i s o p e r a t i o n can o n l y be




13 f u n c t i o n se tWeathe r ( i n t t empe ra tu r e , b oo l r a i n i n g ) p u b l i c on lyOwner
{
14 cu r r e n tTempe r a t u r e = t empe r a t u r e ;
15 i s R a i n i n g = r a i n i n g ;
16 emi t WeatherEvent ( t empe ra tu r e , r a i n i n g ) ;
17 }
18
19 f u n c t i o n getWeather ( ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( i n t , b oo l ) {
20 r e t u r n ( cu r r en tTempe ra tu r e , i s R a i n i n g ) ;
21 }
22
23 e v en t WeatherEvent ( i n t t empe ra tu r e , b oo l r a i n i n g ) ;
24 }
4.7.7 Known Uses
A well known implementation of the Oracle pattern can be found in the FlightDelay contract
6. This contract provides insurance for delayed flights, available to be subscribed by anyone.
Since access to flight data is required for the operation of the contract, an oracle is used to
fetch such data.
Whenever the user requests insurance for a flight, the request is relayed through the oracle,
which will then provide risk parameters for the flight. Considering these parameters, the
insurance could be accepted or denied. For the first case, a call to the requester contract is
6https://github.com/etherisc/flightDelay
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scheduled for the date of arrival of the flight - this call contains information about the state
of the flight and will trigger, if it is deemed that the flight is late, a transfer to the user.
4.8 Automatic Deprecation
4.8.1 Intent
Restrict the operational time frame of a contract.
4.8.2 Motivation
Certain contracts may expose operations which should not be available after a certain amount
of time. For instance, token sales may provide special conditions for early buyers and limit
sales after a predetermined time period. In other cases, test contracts may be deployed,
which eventually should have their functionality turned off.
The Automatic Deprecation pattern can be used in this cases: this pattern considers that
certain (eventually deprecated) operations should be guarded with a modifier, to ensure that
they are not executed past a certain time.
4.8.3 Applicability
This pattern can be used when:
• test contracts are deployed.
• use cases with functionality that is not safe or should not be enabled past a certain
time period.
4.8.4 Participants
There are two entities that participate in this pattern. The caller contract calls a function
in the target contract, that contains this pattern. When the function is invoked, a check
will be performed to ensure that the time threshold is not passed.
4.8. Automatic Deprecation 55
Figure 4.8: Sequence Diagram for Automatic Deprecation design pattern.
4.8.5 Consequences
The consequence of employing this contract is that some (or all) operations will not be
available post some time point. While this is the intended behavior, this might limit the
usefulness of a contract in certain situations. However, provided that the users are aware of
this concern, its use is generally safe.
4.8.6 Sample Code
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t Au tomat i cDep r e ca t i o n {
4 a d d r e s s owner = msg . s e n d e r ;
5 u i n t a c t i v e U n t i l = now + 30 days ;
6 boo l i s R a i n i n g ;
7
8 m o d i f i e r i s A c t i v e {




13 f u n c t i o n o p e r a t i o n ( ) p u b l i c i s A c t i v e {
14 // Do someth ing
15 emi t Ope r a t i o nExecu t ed ( ) ;
16 }
17
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18 e v en t Ope r a t i o nExecu t ed ( ) ;
19 }
4.8.7 Known Uses
The Automatic Deprecation pattern is used in the Polkadot token sale smart contract 7.
The Polkadot project aims to provide a framework for interoperability between different
blockchains, allowing the transfer of value and data. In order to ensure that state altering
operations only occur in a specific time frame, the automatic deprecation pattern is applied.
A when_active modifier is used in most operations. This modifier ensures that the current
time is not after a predetermined end date.
4.9 Data Segregation
4.9.1 Intent
Maintain contract storage separate from logic, thus allowing keeping it stable between con-
tract upgrades.
4.9.2 Motivation
One of the challenges when performing upgrades of smart contracts is dealing with data
storage migrations. Since upgrades (using the Contract Relay pattern, described in section
4.10) simply consist of deploying a newer version of a smart contract, without effective
deprecation of the old version - which is, as with all Ethereum smart contracts, immutable-,
all the contract state is kept in the old, legacy version.
Dealing with data migrations not only adds a significant development overhead in the deploy-
ment process, but can also be expensive, in terms of gas costs. In fact, storage operations
are significantly costly in the EVM, which can be explained by the fact that all nodes of the
network will have to store this data.
The Data Segregation pattern presents a solution to tackle these issues, avoiding complex
data migration tasks during contract upgrades. This pattern establishes the need for a
separate contract that holds all relevant contract state. This contract should be flexible, in
order to accommodate unforeseen changes to the data structure.
4.9.3 Applicability
The Data Segregation pattern can be used when:
• the contract is upgradeable.
7https://etherscan.io/address/0x54a2d42a40F51259DedD1978F6c118a0f0Eff078#code
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• data migration is deemed to be too complex or expensive.
4.9.4 Participants
There are three entities that participate in this pattern. The contract that actually imple-
ments this pattern stores all the data, as well as the address of the current active contract.
Only requests that originate from that contract are resolved. An administrator is responsible
for changing the active contract, which should be done at the same time of the change in the
relay contract. Lastly, the contract that requires the storage is also a participant, querying
the data storage contract whenever data is necessary for its logic.
Figure 4.9: Sequence Diagram for Data Segregation design pattern.
4.9.5 Consequences
As a consequence of the employment of this pattern, data migrations following contract
upgrades are avoided, which result in advantages in ether costs and deployment complexity.
If the storage contract is built in that way, it can be flexible to support different data
structures that were not initially conceived.
Some disadvantages should also be considered when deciding on the use of this pattern.
Segregation storage and logic results in a more complex development, and often in more
intricate code - primarily due to the need to perform external calls for each and every data
request. As in the case of the Relay pattern implementation, trust is also required on the
part of the users: a malicious administrator could manipulate the storage contract in ways
that would cause loss of Ether for the users.
4.9.6 Sample Code
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1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t DataSeg r ega t i onData {
4
5 a d d r e s s d a t a S e g r e g a t i o n L o g i cAd d r e s s ;
6 mapping ( a d d r e s s=> u i n t ) b a l a n c e s ;
7 mapping ( a d d r e s s=> u i n t ) accountNumbers ;
8
9 c o n s t r u c t o r ( a d d r e s s _address ) p u b l i c {
10 d a t a S e g r e g a t i o n L o g i cAd d r e s s = _address ;
11 }
12
13 m o d i f i e r on lyOwner {
14 r e q u i r e (msg . s e n d e r == da t aS e g r e g a t i o nLog i cAdd r e s s , " Th i s
o p e r a t i o n can o n l y be pe r f o rmed by the data s e g r e g a t i o n l o g i c




18 f u n c t i o n g e tBa l a n c e ( a d d r e s s account ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( u i n t ) {
19 r e t u r n b a l a n c e s [ account ] ;
20 }
21
22 f u n c t i o n getName ( a d d r e s s account ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( u i n t ) {
23 r e t u r n accountNumbers [ account ] ;
24 }
25
26 f u n c t i o n s e tBa l a n c e ( a d d r e s s account , u i n t v a l u e ) p u b l i c on lyOwner {
27 b a l a n c e s [ account ] = v a l u e ;
28 }
29
30 f u n c t i o n setName ( a d d r e s s account , u i n t accountNumber ) p u b l i c
on lyOwner {
31 accountNumbers [ account ] = accountNumber ;
32 }
33 }
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 impo r t " . / DataSeg r ega t i onData . s o l " ;
4
5 c o n t r a c t Da t aS eg r e g a t i o nLog i c {
6
7 DataSeg r ega t i onData da t aS to r ag e = new DataSeg r ega t i onData ( a d d r e s s (
t h i s ) ) ;
8
9 f u n c t i o n addBa lance ( ) p u b l i c {
10 da t aS to r ag e . s e tBa l a n c e (msg . s ende r , d a t aS to r ag e . g e tBa l a n c e (msg .
s e n d e r ) + 1) ;
11 }
12 }
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4.9.7 Known Uses
The Data Segregation pattern is used, for instance, in the SAN Token project 8. This
project concerns the sale of tokens for a platform supplying financial data for cryptocurrency
related assets.
For the sale of tokens, the main contract relies on several helper contracts, each holding
specific pieces of data 9. These contracts store the balances, the addresses of the buyers
and min and max amount of tokens that can be bought.
4.9.8 Related Patterns
The Data Segregation pattern is deeply related with the Contract Relay pattern discussed in
section 4.10. Both are widely used for allowing smart contract upgradeability, thus enabling
correction of faults and improvement of functional behavior in smart contracts.
4.10 Contract Relay
4.10.1 Intent
Allow smart contract upgrades without breaking the functionality of dependents.
4.10.2 Also Known As
Proxy.
4.10.3 Motivation
One of the main constraints of Ethereum contract development is the inherent immutability
of deployment - once any contract is deployed, it is kept without changes in the blockchain.
However, this constraint causes significant hurdles for the developers, since any faults that
are found will be, by design, unfixable. This can lead, in the worst cases, to loss of funds.
The impossibility to upgrade contracts also inhibits the reaction to different usage patterns
and stales improvement of the whole smart contract ecosystem. In order to address these
limitations, the Contract Relay pattern can be used. This design pattern uses the modular-
ization of a smart contract into different entities to achieve effective mutability, even though
all deployed contracts are kept in the blockchain.
4.10.4 Applicability
The following cases are suitable for the application of this pattern:
8https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yutgXroxwDC5wHGzSZsPZDTdDDqXVJXqtOA5lraTa1U/edit
9https://etherscan.io/address/0xDa2Cf810c5718135247628689D84F94c61B41d6A#code
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• upgrading smart contracts is a requirement.
• there is a need to proxy calls to other contracts.
4.10.5 Participants
There are three participants in this pattern. The caller, the relay contract and the target
contract. The caller only interacts with the relay directly, never with the target contract.
Whenever a relay receives a call it will proxy that call to a configurable - by an administrator
- address, which corresponds to the current target contract.
Figure 4.10: Sequence Diagram for Contract Relay design pattern.
4.10.6 Consequences
The Contract Relay pattern offers a straightforward mechanism to address one of the limi-
tations concerning the development of complex use cases in the Ethereum ecosystem - the
immutability of smart contract deployments.
As with other patterns, one of the disadvantages of this approach is that trust is required on
the administrator, as the contract is effectively not immutable anymore and its functionality
can be substantially altered by this administrator. In fact, it would be trivial for an adminis-
trator to alter a contract with user funds and change one of the operations to transfer ether
to an address of his choice. To avoid full trust, a compromise could be to deploy immutable
smart contracts that contain sensitive operations and high access level, and only consider
for mutability other, less sensitive components.
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4.10.7 Sample Code
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t Re l a y {
4 a d d r e s s owner = msg . s e n d e r ;
5 a d d r e s s p u b l i c c u r r e n t V e r s i o n = msg . s e n d e r ;
6
7 m o d i f i e r on lyOwner {
8 r e q u i r e (msg . s e n d e r == owner , " Th i s o p e r a t i o n can o n l y be




12 f u n c t i o n changeCon t r a c t ( a d d r e s s newVer s i on ) p u b l i c on lyOwner {
13 c u r r e n t V e r s i o n = newVer s i on ;
14 }
15
16 f u n c t i o n ( ) e x t e r n a l {
17 ( boo l s u c c e s s , ) = c u r r e n t V e r s i o n . d e l e g a t e c a l l (msg . data ) ;




As this pattern mostly addresses the immutability concerns of smart contracts, there are
other patterns related to it. One of those is the Emergency Stop pattern, discussed in
section 4.2. Emergency stop could be used as a temporary measure to avoid exploitation of
a serious fault, while the Contract Relay pattern could be used to fix the root cause of the
issue, thus restoring normal functionality.
The Data Segregation pattern, discussed in section 4.9 is also deeply associated with the
Contract Relay pattern. It can be used to provide a clear, persistent, storage mechanism for
different versions of a target contract, under a proxy.
4.11 Mutex
4.11.1 Intent
Eliminate the possibility of reentrancy attacks by disabling reentrancy.
4.11.2 Motivation
The possibility of reentrancy attacks, when an called contract recalls the original function is
a serious issue that has already resulted in successful attacks. Some patterns exist whose
major purpose is providing a defense against this type of attack vector: for instance, the
Checks Effects Interaction and the Pull Payment pattern.
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The Mutex pattern offers another strategy to avoid these type of attacks. In computer
science, mutex is a technique to avoid simultaneous access to a shared resource, by using a
flag to indicate if the resource is already available or not. The mutex pattern borrows from
this concept, by proposing the definition of a state variable which is set when a flow that
should not be reentrable is started - having this flag unset is a requirement to start this flow,
so any attempt on reentrancy will not be allowed.
4.11.3 Applicability
The Mutex can be used when:
• the control flow should not simultaneously enter the same flow.
4.11.4 Participants
The mutex pattern has three participant entities: the target contract, that contains the
mutex flag, the caller contract and an interacting contract. The caller contract will start
the transaction by calling the target contract. Once this contract is called, its logic will be
run, setting the mutex flag. An eventual interaction can occur, and the interacting contract
will have control over the flow of the transaction - however, since the mutex flag is active, he
will not be able to recall the original flow of the target contract, thus avoiding the reentrancy
attack vector.
Figure 4.11: Sequence Diagram for Mutex design pattern.
4.11.5 Consequences
The mutex pattern guards critical flows against reentrancy. This can be extremely useful
to safeguard contracts against a very common type of attack, whose safety analysis tends
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to be non trivial. However, by limiting reentrancy, legitimate development options can be
affected: for instance, no recursive calls would be possible.
The affects of the mutex pattern in gas costs are mostly negligible - the overhead is limited
to storing an extra boolean field and writing to the field twice, per operation (setting and
unsetting the flag).
4.11.6 Sample Code
1 pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 . 6 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t Mutex {
4 boo l l o c k e d = f a l s e ;
5
6 m o d i f i e r a v o i dR e c u r s i o n ( ) {
7 r e q u i r e ( l o c k e d == f a l s e , " Reen t r ancy d e t e c t e d " ) ;
8 l o c k e d = t r u e ;
9 _;
10 l o c k e d = f a l s e ;
11 }
12
13 f u n c t i o n doSometh ing ( ) p u b l i c a v o i dR e c u r s i o n {




The Mutex pattern is used, for instance, in the Veredictum project 10, specifically on the
smart contract for the Ventana token. The goal of Veredictum is to provide a platform to
protect copyrights of film and video producers, as well as to offer new distribution channels.
In the Ventana token sale smart contract, all public mutating functions are executed under
a mutex. In the contract ReentryProtected, two modifiers (preventReentry and noReentry)
and a boolean flag are defined, to implement the desired behaviour.
4.11.8 Related Patterns
Patterns that are related to the Mutex include the Checks Effects Interaction, discussed in





Betting On The Block dApp
As a platform to showcase the appropriate use of several design patterns in a real context,
the development of a decentralized app was devised - the Betting On The Block dApp.
This application, which is described and analysed in this chapter, has the goal of providing a
platform for betting, along with all the operational concerns that are required for this main
use case. Since the Ethereum platform provides support for currency transactions, along
with features that allow easy access control, this goal can be relatively simple to achieve.
The use cases of the Betting On The Block dApp are illustrated in the use case diagram of
figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Use case diagram of Betting On The Block dApp.
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An user is able to view multiple events and bet in their outcome. An event can be anything,
but it generally would correspond to some type of sport event.
For the user to be able to bet in the outcome of an event, he should have the expectation
to win some amount of Ether if his selection is correct, and loose the amount of the bet if
his selection is not correct. The multiplier that determines the amount the user can win is
called the odd. For instance, if the user bets 5 wei in an outcome with odd 3.0, he would
receive back 15 wei (including his stake) if he won. Otherwise, he would loose his 5 wei
stake.
The proposed smart contract should mediate the placement and settlement of bets. In order
for the user to receive Ether in case his selection is correct, someone should inject liquidity.
This is the responsibility of the contract administrator. Once a user places a bet, his stake
is withheld until the event is settled; the same happens to the liquidity required to pay off
his potential earnings. For a bet of 15 wei at 3.0 odds, a total liquidity of 10 wei is required
(the stake itself is only returned, not part of the earnings).
The main goal of the contract, as a mediator, is to ensure that the user should not trust
the administrator of the contract: by design, the user balance and bets should be safe due
to the guarantees provided (again, by design) by the contract. This concern is a primary
driver for decisions taken in the implementation.
5.1 Architecture
In order for the Betting On The Block dApp to comply with the proposed requirements, the
architecture represented by the class diagram in figure 5.2 was used.
Figure 5.2: Class diagram of Betting On The Block dApp.
A total of six contracts are considered:







The AccessControl contract holds the administrator and the operators addresses. It also
provides several methods to allow verification if a certain address is an operator or an ad-
ministrator. Also, it allows the administrator to insert a new address of an operator and to
remove an address from the operators list.
The Balances contract holds the current balance of each user of the Betting On The Block
dApp, as well as the total liquidity available for betting. It provides several methods, to
allow a user to deposit and withdraw from their balance, to allow adding liquidity as well as
withdrawing this liquidity - this last operation is only available to the administrator. Other
operations for incrementing and decrementing account and liquidity balances are available,
but can only be called by the BetHolder contract.
The Events contract holds all the information about the events that an user can bet on,
including details from these events and the odds of each selection. It provides operations
for adding new events, changing selection odds, closing events - all these can only be used
by operators - and fetching several event related informations.
The BetHolder contract holds all the bets placed in the dApp. It allows users to make bets
and to settle event results. Also, it provides several methods for retrieving user bets and the
bets places in a specific event.
The BetOracle contract is responsible for providing information about the winner of an
event. The address of the BetOracle should be provided at the time of event creation,
by the operators, and cannot be changed once an event is created. This contract provides
methods for verifying if a winner is already set and for setting a winner - only available to the
contract owner - which preferably should be a third-party, not an administrator or operator
of the Betting On The Block dApp. Once set, the winner cannot be changed.
The AlwaysZeroBetOracle contract inherits from the BetOracle contract, but considers the
result to be already set upon creation, and the winner will always be the selection with index
0. This contract is used for testing purposes.
The full code for these contracts is available in annex A.
5.2 Flows
5.2.1 End-to-end
A full end-to-end flow of this contract is represented in figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Sequence diagram of end-to-end flow of Betting On The Block
dApp.
The administrator starts by adding liquidity to the Betting On The Block dApp. Without
liquidity, the user is not able to place a bet, as there is no Ether to use in order to pay
his potential earnings. All earnings from a user are limited by the liquidity available in the
Balances contract.
The administrator will then set an address as an operator, thus enabling this address to
perform several authenticated functions on the dApp. The operator will create an event,
specifying the selections available for this event, and their respective odds, as well as the
oracle that will supply the data of the selection winner.
An user can now place a bet, but first a deposit should be performed, otherwise any bet
placement will fail due to lack of balance. After the outcome of the event is known, the
oracle will update the winner selection. The bet can now be settled by anyone, but this task
should fall upon the operator, preferably. The rationale behind allowing anyone to settle
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an event is to protect the user against potential abuses by the dApp owners, where these
owners would block some bet settlements that would result in large losses.
The settlement of the bet will trigger the update of user balances for the users that place a
bet on winner selection, and the increment of the liquidity for the remaining bets. The user
will then be able to withdraw all the earnings reflected in his account balance.
5.2.2 Odd changed after bet placed
The sequence diagram representing the result of a bet settlement with a user placing a bet
before the odd is changed is represented in figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Sequence diagram of a flow where a bet is made prior to a change
of odds.
As can be observed, the user will receive the payout with the original odd he bet on (3.5).
In fact, the new odd set by the operator will only be used for new bets.
5.2.3 Stop BetHolder contract
The sequence diagram for the flow where an administrator stops the BetHolder contract is
shown in figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: Sequence diagram of a flow where the BetHolder contract is
stopped.
As can be observed, User 1 is able to place a bet normally. However, after the administrator
stops the contract, User 2 is not able to place a bet anymore. It should be noted however
that settling an event is still possible, even in the stopped contract - in this way, the user is
protected against abuse by the owners of the dApp.
5.2.4 Close Event
The sequence diagram for the flow where an operator closes an event is shown in figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Sequence diagram of a flow where an Event is closed.
Closing an event could be used for cases where betting on the event would not be appro-
priate, but the result is not yet known. For instance, when a football game has already
started, further betting should not be allowed, as this could allow for easy to abuse betting
opportunities.
5.3 Applied patterns
In then context of the development of Betting On The Block, several design patterns were
used. This section provides an overview of the motivation for their employment as well as
the advantages and caveats of the implementation.
5.3.1 Checks Effects Interaction
There is only three single occurrences where the Betting On The Block dApp delegates the
control flow to an external account/contract - when it sends balance to an user, when it
transfers liquidity to an administrator and when it retrieves the event winner information
from the Oracle. Other calls are all made to other contracts in the dApp.
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In order to deal with first two instances of delegation of control, the Check Effects Interaction
pattern is applied, for the Balances contract. As such, the transfer of control is performed
as the last operation in each method call:
1 f u n c t i o n w i t h d r a w L i q u i d i t y ( u i n t va lueToWithdraw ) p u b l i c on lyAdmin {
2 r e q u i r e ( va lueToWithdraw <= t o t a l L i q u i d i t y , "Withdraw v a l u e i s not
a l l ow e d f o r the t o t a l l i q u i d i t y " ) ;
3 t o t a l L i q u i d i t y −= va lueToWithdraw ;
4 emi t U p d a t e L i q u i d i t y ( t o t a l L i q u i d i t y ) ;
5 msg . s e n d e r . t r a n s f e r ( va lueToWithdraw ) ;
6 }
1 f u n c t i o n w i thd raw ( u i n t amount ) p u b l i c {
2 r e q u i r e ( amount <= ac coun tBa l a n c e s [ msg . s e n d e r ] , "Withdraw v a l u e i s not
a l l ow e d " ) ;
3 a c coun tBa l a n c e s [ msg . s e n d e r ] −= amount ;
4 emi t Withdraw (msg . s ende r , amount ) ;
5 msg . s e n d e r . t r a n s f e r ( amount ) ;
6 }
5.3.2 Mutex
As described in section 5.3.1, there are three instance where delegation of control occurs
to external entities, one of which is when a call to fetch the Oracle results is made. Since
fetching these results could not be done as the last operation in the contract, a possibility to
avoid attacks is to use the mutex pattern, this way, it is not possible for the Oracle contract
to recall the original method to try to obtain an advantage.
1 c o n t r a c t Be tHo lde r {
2
3 boo l l o c k e d = f a l s e ;
4
5 m o d i f i e r a v o i dR e c u r s i o n ( ) {
6 r e q u i r e ( l o c k e d == f a l s e , " Reen t r ancy d e t e c t e d " ) ;
7 l o c k e d = t r u e ;
8 _;
9 l o c k e d = f a l s e ;
10 }
11
12 f u n c t i o n s e tW inne rFo rEven t ( u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d ) p u b l i c a v o i dR e c u r s i o n {
13 r e q u i r e ( ! i sWinne rKnownForEvent I d [ e v e n t I d ] , "Winner i s a l r e a d y
s e t " ) ;
14
15 u i n t w i n n e r S e l e c t i o n = e v e n t sCon t r a c t . g e tE v en tO r a c l e ( e v e n t I d ) .
g e tW i n n e r S e l e c t i o n ( ) ;
16 i sW inne rKnownForEvent I d [ e v e n t I d ] = t r u e ;
17 w i n n e r Fo rE v e n t I d [ e v e n t I d ] = w i n n e r S e l e c t i o n ;
18 }
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Another possible guard against this attack vector is to make the getEventOracle call of the
Oracle contract to be annotated with the view modifier, thus voiding the possibility of this
method to perform any state change to the blockchain.
5.3.3 Pull Payment
The pull payment pattern is applied in the Balances contract. Instead of immediately trans-
ferring the earnings of a user to him when settling an event result, the user balance is just
updated, and the user is then able to withdraw his (updated) balance. Since settling a bet
involves updating several user balances, to perform Ether transfers in this method would be
a serious security vulnerability. The implementation of the pull payment pattern (along with
the deposit action) is shown bellow:
1
2 f u n c t i o n d e p o s i t ( ) p u b l i c p a y a b l e {
3 a c coun tBa l a n c e s [ msg . s e n d e r ] += msg . v a l u e ;
4 emi t Depo s i t (msg . s ende r , msg . v a l u e ) ;
5 }
6
7 f u n c t i o n w i thd raw ( u i n t amount ) p u b l i c {
8 r e q u i r e ( amount <= ac coun tBa l a n c e s [ msg . s e n d e r ] , "Withdraw v a l u e i s
not a l l ow e d " ) ;
9 a c coun tBa l a n c e s [ msg . s e n d e r ] −= amount ;
10 emi t Withdraw (msg . s ende r , amount ) ;
11 msg . s e n d e r . t r a n s f e r ( amount ) ;
12 }
5.3.4 Emergency Stop
In order to react against unforeseen vulnerabilities, the emergency stop pattern is applied to
the BetHolder contract. In this way, the administrator is able to stop all bet placements for
an undefined amount of time, thus avoiding exploiting issues in the dApp. This functionality
(bet placement) is the only one that is stopped: event settlement is still enabled and cannot
be stopped - in this way, an user is protected since he can be sure that an administrator will
not be able to stop the contract to avoid payment of a bet that causes the owners losses.
Also, user balance withdrawal is not covered by the emergency stop for the same reasons.
The implementation of this pattern is shown bellow:
1 c o n t r a c t Be tHo lde r {
2 boo l p u b l i c i s S t o p p e d = f a l s e ;
3
4 m o d i f i e r nonStopped ( ) {
5 r e q u i r e ( ! i sS topped , " Con t r a c t i s s topped , o p e r a t i o n i s not




9 f u n c t i o n makeBet ( u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d , u i n t 3 2 s e l e c t i o n I d , u i n t v a l u e )
p u b l i c nonStopped {
10 r e q u i r e ( ! e v e n t sCon t r a c t . i s E v e n tC l o s e d ( e v e n t I d ) , " Event i s c l o s e d
" ) ;
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11 r e q u i r e ( ! e v e n t sCon t r a c t . i s E v e n t S e t t l e d ( e v e n t I d ) , " Event i s
a l r e a d y s e t t l e d " ) ;
12 r e q u i r e ( b a l a n c e sCo n t r a c t . g e tBa l a n c e (msg . s e n d e r ) >= va l u e , "There
i s not enough b a l a n c e " ) ;
13 r e q u i r e ( v a l u e > 0 , " Va lue s h o u l d be g r e a t e r than 0" ) ;
14
15 u i n t s e l e c t i o nOdd = e v e n t sCon t r a c t . g e t S e l e c t i o nOdd ( e v e n t I d ,
s e l e c t i o n I d ) ;
16 u i n t p o t e n t i a l E a r n i n g s = s e l e c t i o nOdd ∗ v a l u e / 100 − v a l u e ;
17 b a l a n c e sCo n t r a c t . upda t eBa l ance (msg . s ende r , v a l u e , f a l s e ) ;
18 b a l a n c e sCo n t r a c t . u p d a t e L i q u i d i t y ( p o t e n t i a l E a r n i n g s , f a l s e ) ;
19
20 Bet memory newBet = Bet (msg . s ende r , e v e n t I d , s e l e c t i o n I d ,
s e l e c t i o nOdd , v a l u e , f a l s e ) ;
21 bet sByEvent [ e v e n t I d ] . push ( newBet ) ;





The Balances contract holds all the Ether of the Betting On The Block dApp. All trans-
actions within this contract, excluding withdrawals and deposits, which are able to change
user balances and available liquidity are performed through the BetHolder contract. As such,
changing the address of this contract could be an attack vector to arbitrarily transfer user
balances to liquidity and thus enable the administrator to fraudulently withdraw Ether from
the users.
To avoid this issue, any change to the BetHolder address, after the initial set up, should
await a trial period of seven days, during which any user could audit the new contract to
ensure that the new contract does not introduce vulnerabilities. The administrator should
initially request an update to the BetHolder contract address, specifying the new address.
After this request, the administrator should submit a transaction to set this new bet holder
address, which will only successful if the seven days have elapsed.
The implementation is shown bellow:
1 c o n t r a c t Ba l a n c e s {
2
3 s t r u c t UpdateBetHo lde rReques t {
4 u i n t t ime ;
5 a d d r e s s newBetHo lde rAdd re s s ;
6 }
7
8 a d d r e s s b e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ;
9 mapping ( a d d r e s s => UpdateBetHo lde rReques t )
r e q u e s t s F o rUpd a t i n gBe tHo l d e r ;
10 u i n t c o n s t a n t c h ang eBe tHo l d e rAdd r e s sWa i t i n gPe r i o d = 7 days ;
11
12 f u n c t i o n r e qu e s tUpda t eBe tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( a d d r e s s newAddress ) p u b l i c
on lyAdmin {
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13 r e q u e s t s F o rUpd a t i n gBe tHo l d e r [ msg . s e n d e r ] =
UpdateBetHo lde rReques t ( now + changeBe tHo l d e rAdd r e s sWa i t i n gPe r i o d ,
newAddress ) ;
14 emi t Reques tToChangeBetHo lde rAddres s (msg . s ende r , now +
changeBe tHo l d e rAdd r e s sWa i t i n gPe r i o d , newAddress ) ;
15 }
16
17 m o d i f i e r v a l i d a t eUpd a t eB e tHo l d e rA d d r e s s ( a d d r e s s newAddress ) {
18 i f ( b e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s != a d d r e s s (0 ) ) { // A l l ow s e t up o f the
BetHo lde r a d d r e s s immed i a t e l y i f i t was n e v e r s e t
19 UpdateBetHo lde rReques t memory r e q u e s t =
r e q u e s t s F o rUpd a t i n gBe tHo l d e r [ msg . s e n d e r ] ;
20 r e q u i r e ( r e q u e s t . t ime <= now , " Ope r a t i o n can not be e x e cu t ed
r i g h t now" ) ;
21 r e q u i r e ( r e q u e s t . newBetHo lde rAdd re s s == newAddress , "New
ad d r e s s does not match p r e v i o u s r e q u e s t " ) ;
22 _;
23 d e l e t e r e q u e s t s F o rUpd a t i n gBe tHo l d e r [ msg . s e n d e r ] ;





29 f u n c t i o n s e tB e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( a d d r e s s newAddress ) p u b l i c on lyAdmin
v a l i d a t eUpd a t eB e tHo l d e rA d d r e s s ( newAddress ) {
30 b e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s = newAddress ;
31 }
32
33 e v en t Reques tToChangeBetHo lde rAddres s ( add r e s s , u i n t , a d d r e s s ) ; //
r e q u e s t e r , t ime where change occur , new bet h o l d e r a d d r e s s
5.3.6 Oracle
In order to settle events, the outcome must be known. As such, since the result of the event
can not be obtained easily from inside the blockchain, an oracle is required to provide this
information. The oracle is a contract that should be set up upon the event creation and, in
this case, should be administered by a third party, to avoid setting results that would benefit
the dApp owners.
The implementation of the BetOracle is shown bellow:
1 c o n t r a c t Be tOrac l e {
2
3 boo l p u b l i c i s W i n n e r A v a i l a b l e = f a l s e ;
4 u i n t w i nn e r ;
5 a d d r e s s p u b l i c admin = msg . s e n d e r ;
6
7 m o d i f i e r on lyAdmin ( ) {
8 r e q u i r e (msg . s e n d e r == admin , " Th i s o p e r a t i o n i s o n l y a u t h o r i z e d




12 // Re tu rn s the w i nn e r i n d e x s e l e c t i o n i f i t i s a v a i l a b l e , o t h e r w i s e
th rows .
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13 f u n c t i o n g e tW i n n e r S e l e c t i o n ( ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( u i n t ) {
14 r e q u i r e ( i s W i n n e r A v a i l a b l e , "Winner i s not a v a i l a b l e y e t " ) ;
15 r e t u r n w i nn e r ;
16 }
17
18 f u n c t i o n s e tW inne r ( u i n t w inne rToSet ) p u b l i c on lyAdmin {
19 r e q u i r e ( ! i s W i n n e r A v a i l a b l e , "Winner i s a l r e a d y s e t " ) ;
20 i s W i n n e r A v a i l a b l e = t r u e ;
21 w inne r = winnerToSet ;
22 emi t WinnerSet ( w i nn e r ) ;
23 }
24
25 e v en t WinnerSet ( u i n t ) ;
26 }
5.4 Tests
In order to guarantee that the system behaves as intended, a comprehensive suite of 49 tests
was developed. These tests not only verify the correct functionality of each individual smart
contract (unit tests) but also test the end-to-end flows, both common and uncommon.





(d) fail add operator
2. AlwaysZeroBetOracle Contract
(a) is winner 0
(b) winner should not be changeable
3. Balances Contract
(a) deposit
(b) withdraw balance with available funds
(c) fail to withdraw balance without available funds
(d) add liquidity
(e) withdraw liquidity with available funds
(f) fail to withdraw liquidity without available funds
(g) fail to withdraw liquidity for non admin user
(h) fail to set bet holder without previous request
(i) fail to set bet holder with not enough time passed
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4. BetOracle Contract
(a) winner should not be set
(b) fail to set winner with non admin account
(c) set winner
(d) winner should not be changeable
5. BetHolder Contract
(a) make simple bet
(b) fail to make bet in non existing selection
(c) fail to make bet in non existing event
(d) fail to make bet in closed event
(e) fail to make bet without enough user balance
(f) fail to make bet without liquidity
(g) fail to make bet with value 0
(h) fail to make bet in stopped contract
(i) settle simple bet (user won)
(j) settle simple bet (user lost)
(k) fail to settle bet without result available
(l) fail to settle bet without setting result
(m) stop contract and resume it
(n) fail to stop contract for non admin account
(o) get user bets
6. Events Contract
(a) create event




The code for each test is available in annex B.
5.5 Improvements
Several improvements were identified in the development of this dApp, but were not con-
sidered, either for being out of scope of this work or due to the development effort required
for proper implementation:
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1. Implement multiple oracles to be able to avoid a single oracle selecting the wrong
result and collect undue earnings.
2. Set the closing time of an event, in order to not allow bets after the closing time is
passed.
3. Allow setting the maximum liquidity on a per event basis, instead of globally. This
allows greater granularity and significant lowering of total business risks.
4. Allow voiding of events in oracle: some events may never have a valid result - for
instance, a cancelled football match. In order to handle this situation, the Oracle





This chapter provides an overview of the objectives achieved in this work, along with future
work to be done and a personal overview.
6.1 Work Summary
This dissertation aims to document and analyse the most relevant design patterns employed
in Ethereum Smart Contracts. A thorough review of the literature, explained in section 1.4.1
was carried out, along with an analysis of smart contracts deployed in the Ethereum main
network.
A total of eleven smart contracts were identified and systematically analysed in chapter 4:
• Checks Effects Interaction (in section 4.1)
• Emergency Stop (in section 4.2)
• Speed Bump (in section 4.3)
• Rate Limit (in section 4.4)
• Balance Limit (in section 4.5)
• Pull Payment (in section 4.6)
• Oracle (in section 4.7)
• Automatic Deprecation (in section 4.8)
• Data Segregation (in section 4.9)
• Contract Relay (in section 4.10)
• Mutex (in section 4.11)
The analysis of each design pattern followed a consistent schema, comprising the Intent, the
Motivation, the Applicability, the Participants, Known Uses, Related Patterns and a sample
implementation in Solidity.
The design patterns identified as part of this work were effectively used in a complex use
case, demonstrated in chapter 5. Considering the specific concerns of blockchain software
engineering, extensive automated testing was prioritized and the functional requirements of
the dApp were implemented successfully.
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6.2 Gas Costs with Proof Of Stake Consensus
Currently, gas costs are an important concern for the application of design patterns - in fact,
gas costs tend to be the largest operational expense to run a smart contract. As such, in
chapter 4, the impact of gas costs of each pattern was discussed.
However, recent developments, during the development of this work, point to the fact that
gas costs will tend to be less relevant. In fact, the switch of the consensus mechanism
to Proof Of Stake (see section 2.2.1), from Proof Of Work, is largely anticipated to slash
gas prices. The price decrease is expected due to the larger scalability provided by the new
consensus mechanism, as well as the lower costs required to maintain the network, compared
to the current Proof Of Work approach. The change to Proof Of Stake is set to occur in
the deployment of Ethereum 2.0.
6.3 Limitations and Future Work
While the objectives set in chapter 1 were achieved, several limitations were identified.
An important improvement upon this work would be to perform a taxonomic analysis of the
identified design patterns. The main reason for this to not have been done is the relative
low number of identified patterns.
In relation to the Betting On The Block dApp, several limitations were identified and analysed
in section 5.5.
As part of the future work, the development of a Front End for the Betting On The Block
dApp is also considered. This was not considered a priority since it is completely aligned
with the scope of this dissertation, but it would be valuable to showcase the dApp design
decisions and use cases.
6.4 Personal overview
A noteworthy observation in relation to this work is that a significant amount of knowledge
and innovation in this field is not part of the white literature but rather of the grey literature,
often spearheaded by enthusiasts, entrepreneurs and the cryptocurrency industry in general.
Innovative approaches to design patterns are often developed by the industry, instead of
being done in an academic context.
Another relevant observation is the relative lack of features of the Solidity language. For
instance, operations over mappings are very limited - even simple operations such as fetching
the number of elements in a mapping are not present.
The development tools for smart contracts development, namely the Truffle suite, provide
a productive environment for achieving the goals set in chapter 5.
As a final observation, the simplicity of the Solidity language and the intrinsic features of the
blockchain, making access control and currency transfers easy to implement, allowed for the
relatively ambitious functional requirements of the Betting On The Block dApp to be met
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with few lines of code - under 600 lines. While a reason for this is due to the chosen design,
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Appendix A
Betting On The Block dApp Smart
Contracts
A.1 AccessControl Contract
1 pragma s o l i d i t y ^ 0 . 5 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t Ac c e s sCon t r o l {
4
5 mapping ( a d d r e s s=>boo l ) i n t e r n a l o p e r a t o r s ;
6 a d d r e s s i n t e r n a l admin = msg . s e n d e r ;
7
8 m o d i f i e r on lyAdmin ( ) {





13 f u n c t i o n i sAdmin ( a d d r e s s add r ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( boo l ) {
14 r e t u r n admin == addr ;
15 }
16
17 f u n c t i o n i sO p e r a t o r ( a d d r e s s add r ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( boo l ) {
18 r e t u r n o p e r a t o r s [ add r ] ;
19 }
20
21 f u n c t i o n addOpera to r ( a d d r e s s toAdd ) p u b l i c on lyAdmin {
22 o p e r a t o r s [ toAdd ] = t r u e ;
23 emi t OperatorAdded ( toAdd ) ;
24 }
25
26 f u n c t i o n removeOpera to r ( a d d r e s s toRemove ) p u b l i c on lyAdmin {
27 o p e r a t o r s [ toRemove ] = f a l s e ;
28 emi t OperatorRemoved ( toRemove ) ;
29 }
30
31 e v en t OperatorAdded ( a d d r e s s ) ;
32 e v en t OperatorRemoved ( a d d r e s s ) ;
33 }
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A.2 BetOracle Contract
1 pragma s o l i d i t y ^ 0 . 5 . 0 ;
2
3 c o n t r a c t Be tOrac l e {
4
5 boo l p u b l i c i s W i n n e r A v a i l a b l e = f a l s e ;
6 u i n t w i nn e r ;
7 a d d r e s s p u b l i c admin = msg . s e n d e r ;
8
9 m o d i f i e r on lyAdmin ( ) {
10 r e q u i r e (msg . s e n d e r == admin , " Th i s o p e r a t i o n i s o n l y a u t h o r i z e d




14 // Re tu rn s the w i nn e r i n d e x s e l e c t i o n i f i t i s a v a i l a b l e , o t h e r w i s e
th rows .
15 f u n c t i o n g e tW i n n e r S e l e c t i o n ( ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( u i n t ) {
16 r e q u i r e ( i s W i n n e r A v a i l a b l e , "Winner i s not a v a i l a b l e y e t " ) ;
17 r e t u r n w i nn e r ;
18 }
19
20 f u n c t i o n s e tW inne r ( u i n t w inne rToSet ) p u b l i c on lyAdmin {
21 r e q u i r e ( ! i s W i n n e r A v a i l a b l e , "Winner i s a l r e a d y s e t " ) ;
22 i s W i n n e r A v a i l a b l e = t r u e ;
23 w inne r = winnerToSet ;
24 emi t WinnerSet ( w i nn e r ) ;
25 }
26
27 e v en t WinnerSet ( u i n t ) ;
28 }
A.3 AlwaysZeroBetOracle Contract
1 pragma s o l i d i t y ^ 0 . 5 . 0 ;
2
3 impo r t " . / Be tOrac l e . s o l " ;
4
5 // Re tu rn s the w i nn e r as the s e l e c t i o n w i t h i n d e x 0 .
6 c o n t r a c t A lway sZe roBe tOrac l e i s Be tOrac l e {
7
8 c o n s t r u c t o r ( ) p u b l i c {
9 i s W i n n e r A v a i l a b l e = t r u e ;





1 pragma s o l i d i t y ^ 0 . 5 . 0 ;
2
3 impo r t " . / Ac c e s sCon t r o l . s o l " ;
4
5 c o n t r a c t Ba l a n c e s {
6
7 mapping ( a d d r e s s => u i n t ) i n t e r n a l a c coun tBa l a n c e s ;
8 u i n t p u b l i c t o t a l L i q u i d i t y = 0 ;
9 a d d r e s s b e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ;
10 Acc e s sCon t r o l i n t e r n a l a c c e s s C o n t r o l ;
11
12 c o n s t r u c t o r ( Ac c e s sCon t r o l a c c e s s C t r l ) p u b l i c {
13 a c c e s s C o n t r o l = a c c e s s C t r l ;
14 }
15
16 m o d i f i e r o n l yBe tHo l d e r ( ) {
17 r e q u i r e (msg . s e n d e r == be tHo l d e rAdd r e s s , " Ope r a t i o n o n l y




21 m o d i f i e r on lyAdmin ( ) {
22 r e q u i r e ( a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sAdmin (msg . s e n d e r ) , " Th i s o p e r a t i o n i s




26 f u n c t i o n d e p o s i t ( ) p u b l i c p a y a b l e {
27 a c coun tBa l a n c e s [ msg . s e n d e r ] += msg . v a l u e ;
28 emi t Depo s i t (msg . s ende r , msg . v a l u e ) ;
29 }
30
31 f u n c t i o n w i thd raw ( u i n t amount ) p u b l i c {
32 r e q u i r e ( amount <= ac coun tBa l a n c e s [ msg . s e n d e r ] , "Withdraw v a l u e
i s not a l l ow e d " ) ;
33 a c coun tBa l a n c e s [ msg . s e n d e r ] −= amount ;
34 emi t Withdraw (msg . s ende r , amount ) ;
35 msg . s e n d e r . t r a n s f e r ( amount ) ;
36 }
37
38 f u n c t i o n g e tBa l a n c e ( a d d r e s s add r ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( u i n t ) {
39 r e t u r n a c coun tBa l a n c e s [ add r ] ;
40 }
41
42 f u n c t i o n a d d L i q u i d i t y ( ) p u b l i c p a y a b l e {
43 t o t a l L i q u i d i t y += msg . v a l u e ;
44 emi t L i q u i d i t y D e p o s i t (msg . v a l u e ) ;
45 }
46
47 f u n c t i o n w i t h d r a w L i q u i d i t y ( u i n t va lueToWithdraw ) p u b l i c on lyAdmin {
48 r e q u i r e ( va lueToWithdraw <= t o t a l L i q u i d i t y , "Withdraw v a l u e i s
not a l l ow e d f o r the t o t a l l i q u i d i t y " ) ;
49 t o t a l L i q u i d i t y −= va lueToWithdraw ;
50 emi t U p d a t e L i q u i d i t y ( t o t a l L i q u i d i t y ) ;
51 msg . s e n d e r . t r a n s f e r ( va lueToWithdraw ) ;
52 }
53
54 f u n c t i o n upda t eBa l ance ( a d d r e s s toUpdate , u i n t v a l u e , boo l
s h o u l d I n c r e a s e ) p u b l i c o n l yB e tHo l d e r {
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55 i f ( s h o u l d I n c r e a s e ) {
56 a c coun tBa l a n c e s [ toUpdate ] += v a l u e ;
57 } e l s e {
58 r e q u i r e ( a c coun tBa l a n c e s [ toUpdate ] >= va l u e , " Ba l ance i s
i n s u f f i c i e n t " ) ;
59 a c coun tBa l a n c e s [ toUpdate ] −= v a l u e ;
60 }
61 emi t UpdateBa lance ( toUpdate , a c coun tBa l a n c e s [ toUpdate ] ) ;
62 }
63
64 f u n c t i o n u p d a t e L i q u i d i t y ( u i n t v a l u e , boo l s h o u l d I n c r e a s e ) p u b l i c
o n l yB e tHo l d e r {
65 i f ( s h o u l d I n c r e a s e ) {
66 t o t a l L i q u i d i t y += v a l u e ;
67 } e l s e {
68 r e q u i r e ( t o t a l L i q u i d i t y >= va l u e , " Tota l l i q u i d i t y i s
i n s u f f i c i e n t " ) ;
69 t o t a l L i q u i d i t y −= v a l u e ;
70 }
71 emi t U p d a t e L i q u i d i t y ( t o t a l L i q u i d i t y ) ;
72 }
73
74 f u n c t i o n r e qu e s tUpda t eBe tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( a d d r e s s newAddress ) p u b l i c
on lyAdmin {
75 r e q u e s t s F o rUpd a t i n gBe tHo l d e r [ msg . s e n d e r ] =
UpdateBetHo lde rReques t ( now + changeBe tHo l d e rAdd r e s sWa i t i n gPe r i o d ,
newAddress ) ;
76 emi t Reques tToChangeBetHo lde rAddres s (msg . s ende r , now +
changeBe tHo l d e rAdd r e s sWa i t i n gPe r i o d , newAddress ) ;
77 }
78
79 f u n c t i o n s e tB e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( a d d r e s s newAddress ) p u b l i c on lyAdmin
v a l i d a t eUpd a t eB e tHo l d e rA d d r e s s ( newAddress ) {
80 b e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s = newAddress ;
81 }
82
83 m o d i f i e r v a l i d a t eUpd a t eB e tHo l d e rA d d r e s s ( a d d r e s s newAddress ) {
84 i f ( b e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s != a d d r e s s (0 ) ) {
85 UpdateBetHo lde rReques t memory r e q u e s t =
r e q u e s t s F o rUpd a t i n gBe tHo l d e r [ msg . s e n d e r ] ;
86 r e q u i r e ( r e q u e s t . t ime <= now , " Ope r a t i o n can not be e x e cu t ed
r i g h t now" ) ;
87 r e q u i r e ( r e q u e s t . newBetHo lde rAdd re s s == newAddress , "New
ad d r e s s does not match p r e v i o u s r e q u e s t " ) ;
88 _;
89 d e l e t e r e q u e s t s F o rUpd a t i n gBe tHo l d e r [ msg . s e n d e r ] ;





95 s t r u c t UpdateBetHo lde rReques t {
96 u i n t t ime ;
97 a d d r e s s newBetHo lde rAdd re s s ;
98 }
99 u i n t c o n s t a n t c h ang eBe tHo l d e rAdd r e s sWa i t i n gPe r i o d = 7 days ;
100 mapping ( a d d r e s s => UpdateBetHo lde rReques t )
r e q u e s t s F o rUpd a t i n gBe tHo l d e r ;
101
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102 e v en t Depo s i t ( add r e s s , u i n t ) ;
103 e v en t Withdraw ( add r e s s , u i n t ) ;
104 e v en t UpdateBa lance ( add r e s s , u i n t ) ;
105 e v en t U p d a t e L i q u i d i t y ( u i n t ) ;
106 e v en t L i q u i d i t y D e p o s i t ( u i n t ) ;
107 e v en t Reques tToChangeBetHo lde rAddres s ( add r e s s , u i n t , a d d r e s s ) ; //
r e q u e s t e r , t ime where change occur , new bet h o l d e r a d d r e s s
108 }
A.5 BetHolder Contract
1 pragma s o l i d i t y ^ 0 . 5 . 0 ;
2 pragma e x p e r i m e n t a l ABIEncoderV2 ;
3
4 impo r t " . / Even t s . s o l " ;
5 impo r t " . / Ba l a n c e s . s o l " ;
6 impo r t " . / S h a r e dS t r u c t s . s o l " ;
7 impo r t " . / Ac c e s sCon t r o l . s o l " ;
8
9 c o n t r a c t Be tHo lde r {
10
11 s t r u c t Bet {
12 a d d r e s s from ;
13 u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d ;
14 u i n t 3 2 s e l e c t i o n I d ;
15 u i n t odd ;
16 u i n t v a l u e ;
17 boo l i s S e t t l e d ;
18 }
19
20 mapping ( u i n t 3 2 => Bet [ ] ) be t sByEvent ;
21 mapping ( a d d r e s s => Bet [ ] ) be t sByUse r ;
22 mapping ( u i n t 3 2 => boo l ) s e t t l e d E v e n t s ;
23 mapping ( u i n t 3 2 => boo l ) i sWinne rKnownForEvent I d ;
24 mapping ( u i n t 3 2 => u i n t ) w i n n e r Fo rE v e n t I d ;
25 Event s e v e n t sCon t r a c t ;
26 Ba l an c e s b a l a n c e sCo n t r a c t ;
27 Acc e s sCon t r o l a c c e s sC o n t r o l C o n t r a c t ;
28 boo l p u b l i c i s S t o p p e d = f a l s e ;
29 boo l l o c k e d = f a l s e ;
30
31 m o d i f i e r a v o i dR e c u r s i o n ( ) {
32 r e q u i r e ( l o c k e d == f a l s e , " Reen t r ancy d e t e c t e d " ) ;
33 l o c k e d = t r u e ;
34 _;
35 l o c k e d = f a l s e ;
36 }
37
38 c o n s t r u c t o r ( Even t s e ven t s , Ba l a n c e s b a l a n c e s , A c c e s sCon t r o l
a c c e s s C o n t r o l ) p u b l i c {
39 e v e n t sCon t r a c t = e v e n t s ;
40 b a l a n c e sCo n t r a c t = b a l a n c e s ;
41 a c c e s sC o n t r o l C o n t r a c t = a c c e s s C o n t r o l ;
42 }
43
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44 m o d i f i e r on lyAdmin ( ) {
45 r e q u i r e ( a c c e s sC o n t r o l C o n t r a c t . i sAdmin (msg . s e n d e r ) , " Th i s




49 m o d i f i e r nonStopped ( ) {
50 r e q u i r e ( ! i sS topped , " Con t r a c t i s s topped , o p e r a t i o n i s not




54 f u n c t i o n makeBet ( u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d , u i n t 3 2 s e l e c t i o n I d , u i n t v a l u e )
p u b l i c nonStopped {
55 r e q u i r e ( ! e v e n t sCon t r a c t . i s E v e n tC l o s e d ( e v e n t I d ) , " Event i s c l o s e d
" ) ;
56 r e q u i r e ( ! e v e n t sCon t r a c t . i s E v e n t S e t t l e d ( e v e n t I d ) , " Event i s
a l r e a d y s e t t l e d " ) ;
57 r e q u i r e ( b a l a n c e sCo n t r a c t . g e tBa l a n c e (msg . s e n d e r ) >= va l u e , "There
i s not enough b a l a n c e " ) ;
58 r e q u i r e ( v a l u e > 0 , " Va lue s h o u l d be g r e a t e r than 0" ) ;
59
60 u i n t s e l e c t i o nOdd = e v e n t sCon t r a c t . g e t S e l e c t i o nOdd ( e v e n t I d ,
s e l e c t i o n I d ) ;
61 u i n t p o t e n t i a l E a r n i n g s = s e l e c t i o nOdd ∗ v a l u e / 100 − v a l u e ;
62 b a l a n c e sCo n t r a c t . upda t eBa l ance (msg . s ende r , v a l u e , f a l s e ) ;
63 b a l a n c e sCo n t r a c t . u p d a t e L i q u i d i t y ( p o t e n t i a l E a r n i n g s , f a l s e ) ;
64
65 Bet memory newBet = Bet (msg . s ende r , e v e n t I d , s e l e c t i o n I d ,
s e l e c t i o nOdd , v a l u e , f a l s e ) ;
66 bet sByEvent [ e v e n t I d ] . push ( newBet ) ;
67 be t sByUse r [ msg . s e n d e r ] . push ( newBet ) ;
68 }
69
70 f u n c t i o n s e tW inne rFo rEven t ( u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d ) p u b l i c a v o i dR e c u r s i o n {
71 r e q u i r e ( ! i sWinne rKnownForEvent I d [ e v e n t I d ] , "Winner i s a l r e a d y
s e t " ) ;
72
73 u i n t w i n n e r S e l e c t i o n = e v e n t sCon t r a c t . g e tE v en tO r a c l e ( e v e n t I d ) .
g e tW i n n e r S e l e c t i o n ( ) ;
74 i sW inne rKnownForEvent I d [ e v e n t I d ] = t r u e ;
75 w i n n e r Fo rE v e n t I d [ e v e n t I d ] = w i n n e r S e l e c t i o n ;
76 }
77
78 f u n c t i o n s e t t l e E v e n t ( u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d ) p u b l i c {
79 r e q u i r e ( ! s e t t l e d E v e n t s [ e v e n t I d ] , " Event i s a l r e a d y s e t t l e d " ) ;
80 r e q u i r e ( i sWinne rKnownForEvent I d [ e v e n t I d ] , "Winner i s not y e t s e t
" ) ;
81
82 u i n t w i n n e r S e l e c t i o n = w i n n e r Fo rE v e n t I d [ e v e n t I d ] ;
83
84 Bet [ ] memory b e t s = bet sByEvent [ e v e n t I d ] ;
85 f o r ( u i n t i = 0 ; i < b e t s . l e n g t h ; i ++) {
86 i f ( b e t s [ i ] . s e l e c t i o n I d == w i n n e r S e l e c t i o n ) {
87 b a l a n c e sCo n t r a c t . upda t eBa l ance ( b e t s [ i ] . from , b e t s [ i ] . odd
∗ b e t s [ i ] . v a l u e / 100 , t r u e ) ;
88 } e l s e {
89 b a l a n c e sCo n t r a c t . u p d a t e L i q u i d i t y ( b e t s [ i ] . odd ∗ b e t s [ i ] .
v a l u e / 100 , t r u e ) ;
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90 }
91 }
92 s e t t l e d E v e n t s [ e v e n t I d ] = t r u e ;
93 e v e n t sCon t r a c t . s e t t l e E v e n t ( e v e n t I d ) ;
94 }
95
96 f u n c t i o n ge tBe t sByEven t I d ( u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( Bet [ ]
memory ) {
97 boo l i s E v e n t S e t t l e d = s e t t l e d E v e n t s [ e v e n t I d ] ;
98 Bet [ ] memory b e t s = bet sByEvent [ e v e n t I d ] ;
99 f o r ( u i n t i = 0 ; i < b e t s . l e n g t h ; i ++) {
100 b e t s [ i ] . i s S e t t l e d = i s E v e n t S e t t l e d ;
101 }
102 r e t u r n b e t s ;
103 }
104
105 f u n c t i o n ge tBet sByUse r ( a d d r e s s u s e r ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( Bet [ ]
memory ) {
106 Bet [ ] memory b e t s = be t sByUse r [ u s e r ] ;
107 f o r ( u i n t i = 0 ; i < b e t s . l e n g t h ; i ++) {
108 b e t s [ i ] . i s S e t t l e d = s e t t l e d E v e n t s [ b e t s [ i ] . e v e n t I d ] ;
109 }
110 r e t u r n b e t s ;
111 }
112
113 f u n c t i o n s e tS topped ( boo l s t o pCon t r a c t ) p u b l i c on lyAdmin {
114 i s S t o p p e d = s t o pCon t r a c t ;
115 emi t S t a r t S t opBe tHo l d e r ( s t o pCon t r a c t ) ;
116 }
117
118 e v en t S t a r t S t opBe tHo l d e r ( boo l ) ;
119 }
A.6 Events Contract
1 pragma s o l i d i t y ^ 0 . 5 . 0 ;
2 pragma e x p e r i m e n t a l ABIEncoderV2 ;
3
4 impo r t " . / Ac c e s sCon t r o l . s o l " ;
5 impo r t " . / S h a r e dS t r u c t s . s o l " ;
6
7 c o n t r a c t Even t s {
8
9 mapping ( u i n t 3 2 => u i n t 256 ) i n t e r n a l e v e n t I dTo I n d e x ;
10 Sh a r e dS t r u c t s . Event [ ] p u b l i c e v e n t s ;
11 mapping ( u i n t 3 2 => Sha r e dS t r u c t s . S e l e c t i o n [ ] ) i n t e r n a l
s e l e c t i o n s B y E v e n t I d ;
12 Acc e s sCon t r o l i n t e r n a l a c c e s s C o n t r o l ;
13 a d d r e s s b e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ;
14
15 c o n s t r u c t o r ( Ac c e s sCon t r o l a c c e s s C t r l ) p u b l i c {
16 e v e n t s . push ( S h a r e dS t r u c t s . Event (0 , " v o i d " , new BetOrac l e ( ) , t r ue
, t r u e ) ) ;
17 a c c e s s C o n t r o l = a c c e s s C t r l ;
18 }
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19
20 m o d i f i e r o n l yBe tHo l d e r ( ) {
21 r e q u i r e (msg . s e n d e r == be tHo l d e rAdd r e s s , " Ope r a t i o n o n l y




25 m o d i f i e r o n l yOp e r a t o r s ( ) {
26 r e q u i r e ( a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sO p e r a t o r (msg . s e n d e r ) , " Th i s o p e r a t i o n i s




30 m o d i f i e r on lyAdmin ( ) {
31 r e q u i r e ( a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sAdmin (msg . s e n d e r ) , " Th i s o p e r a t i o n i s




35 f u n c t i o n c r e a t eA c t i v e E v e n t ( S h a r e dS t r u c t s . Event memory evnt ,
S h a r e dS t r u c t s . S e l e c t i o n [ ] memory s e l e c t i o n s ) p u b l i c o n l yOp e r a t o r s {
36 u i n t 2 56 l e n g t h = e v e n t s . push ( e vn t ) ;
37 e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ e vn t . i d ] = l e ng t h −1;
38 f o r ( u i n t i = 0 ; i < s e l e c t i o n s . l e n g t h ; i ++) {




43 f u n c t i o n changeOdds ( u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d , u i n t 3 2 r u n n e r I d , u i n t newOdds )
p u b l i c o n l yOp e r a t o r s {
44 r e q u i r e ( e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ e v e n t I d ] != 0 , " Event ID does not e x i s t " )
;
45 s e l e c t i o n s B y E v e n t I d [ e v e n t I d ] [ r u n n e r I d ] . odd = newOdds ;
46 }
47
48 f u n c t i o n c l o s eE v e n t ( u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d ) p u b l i c o n l yOp e r a t o r s ( ) {
49 r e q u i r e ( e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ e v e n t I d ] != 0 , " Event ID does not e x i s t " ) ;
50 e v e n t s [ e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ e v e n t I d ] ] . i s C l o s e d = t r u e ;
51 emi t Even tC l o s ed ( e v e n t I d ) ;
52 }
53
54 f u n c t i o n ge tEven t ( u i n t 3 2 i d ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( S h a r e dS t r u c t s .
Event memory ) {
55 r e q u i r e ( e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ i d ] != 0 , " Event ID does not e x i s t " ) ;
56 r e t u r n e v e n t s [ e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ i d ] ] ;
57 }
58
59 f u n c t i o n i s E v e n t S e t t l e d ( u i n t 3 2 i d ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( boo l ) {
60 r e q u i r e ( e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ i d ] != 0 , " Event ID does not e x i s t " ) ;
61 r e t u r n e v e n t s [ e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ i d ] ] . i s S e t t l e d ;
62 }
63
64 f u n c t i o n i s E v e n tC l o s e d ( u i n t 3 2 i d ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( boo l ) {
65 r e q u i r e ( e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ i d ] != 0 , " Event ID does not e x i s t " ) ;
66 r e t u r n e v e n t s [ e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ i d ] ] . i s C l o s e d ;
67 }
68
69 f u n c t i o n g e tE v en tO r a c l e ( u i n t 3 2 i d ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s ( Be tOrac l e ) {
70 r e q u i r e ( e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ i d ] != 0 , " Event ID does not e x i s t " ) ;
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71 r e t u r n e v e n t s [ e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ i d ] ] . b e tO r a c l e ;
72 }
73
74 f u n c t i o n g e t S e l e c t i o n s ( u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d ) p u b l i c v i ew r e t u r n s (
S h a r e dS t r u c t s . S e l e c t i o n [ ] memory ) {
75 r e q u i r e ( e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ e v e n t I d ] != 0 , " Event ID does not e x i s t " )
;
76 r e t u r n s e l e c t i o n s B y E v e n t I d [ e v e n t I d ] ;
77 }
78
79 f u n c t i o n g e tS e l e c t i o nOdd ( u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d , u i n t s e l e c t i o n I d x ) p u b l i c
v i ew r e t u r n s ( u i n t ) {
80 r e q u i r e ( e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ e v e n t I d ] != 0 , " Event ID does not e x i s t " )
;
81 r e t u r n s e l e c t i o n s B y E v e n t I d [ e v e n t I d ] [ s e l e c t i o n I d x ] . odd ;
82 }
83
84 f u n c t i o n s e tB e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( a d d r e s s newAddress ) p u b l i c on lyAdmin {
85 b e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s = newAddress ;
86 }
87
88 f u n c t i o n s e t t l e E v e n t ( u i n t 3 2 e v e n t I d ) p u b l i c o n l yB e tHo l d e r {
89 r e q u i r e ( e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ e v e n t I d ] != 0 , " Event ID does not e x i s t " )
;
90 e v e n t s [ e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ e v e n t I d ] ] . i s S e t t l e d = t r u e ;
91 e v e n t s [ e v e n t I dTo I n d e x [ e v e n t I d ] ] . i s C l o s e d = t r u e ;
92 emi t E v e n t S e t t l e d ( e v e n t I d ) ;
93 }
94
95 e v en t Even tC l o s ed ( u i n t 3 2 ) ;
96 e v en t E v e n t S e t t l e d ( u i n t 3 2 ) ;
97 }
A.7 SharedStructs
1 pragma s o l i d i t y ^ 0 . 5 . 0 ;
2 pragma e x p e r i m e n t a l ABIEncoderV2 ;
3
4 impo r t " . / Be tOrac l e . s o l " ;
5
6 l i b r a r y S h a r e dS t r u c t s {
7 s t r u c t S e l e c t i o n {
8 s t r i n g name ;
9 u i n t odd ;
10 }
11
12 s t r u c t Event {
13 u i n t 3 2 i d ;
14 s t r i n g name ;
15 BetOrac l e b e tO r a c l e ;
16 boo l i s S e t t l e d ;
17 boo l i s C l o s e d ;
18 }
19 }
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Appendix B
Betting On The Block dApp Tests
B.1 AccessControl Tests
1 con s t Ac c e s sCon t r o l = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " Ac c e s sCon t r o l " ) ;
2 con s t a s s e r t = r e q u i r e ( ’ a s s e r t ’ ) ;
3
4 c o n t r a c t ( ’ Acces s Con t r o l ’ , a s ync ac coun t s => {
5 l e t a c c e s s C o n t r o l ;
6
7 l e t u s e rAccoun t ;
8 l e t adminAccount ;
9 l e t o p e r a t o rAccoun t ;
10
11 be f o r eEach ( a s ync f u n c t i o n ( ) {
12 a c c e s s C o n t r o l = awa i t A c c e s sCon t r o l . new ( ) ;
13
14 adminAccount = accoun t s [ 0 ] ;
15 use rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 1 ] ;
16 ope r a t o rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 5 ] ;
17 }) ;
18
19 i t ( ’ i s admin ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
20 a s s e r t . ok ( awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sAdmin ( adminAccount ) , " Shou ld be
admin " ) ;
21 a s s e r t . ok ( f a l s e === awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sAdmin ( u s e rAccoun t ) , "
Shou ld not be admin" ) ;
22 a s s e r t . ok ( f a l s e === awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sAdmin ( ope r a t o rAccoun t )
, " Shou ld not be admin " ) ;
23 }) ;
24
25 i t ( ’ add o p e r a t o r ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
26 a s s e r t . ok ( f a l s e === awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sO p e r a t o r (
op e r a t o rAccoun t ) , " Shou ld not be a o p e r a t o r " ) ;
27 awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . addOpera to r ( ope ra to rAccoun t , { from :
adminAccount }) ;
28 a s s e r t . ok ( awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sO p e r a t o r ( op e r a t o rAccoun t ) , "
Shou ld be a o p e r a t o r " ) ;
29 }) ;
30
31 i t ( ’ remove o p e r a t o r ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
32 a s s e r t . ok ( f a l s e === awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sO p e r a t o r (
op e r a t o rAccoun t ) , " Shou ld not be a o p e r a t o r " ) ;
33 awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . addOpera to r ( ope ra to rAccoun t , { from :
adminAccount }) ;
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34 a s s e r t . ok ( awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sO p e r a t o r ( op e r a t o rAccoun t ) , "
Shou ld be a o p e r a t o r " ) ;
35 awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . r emoveOperato r ( ope ra to rAccoun t , { from :
adminAccount }) ;
36 a s s e r t . ok ( f a l s e === awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sO p e r a t o r (
op e r a t o rAccoun t ) , " Shou ld not be a o p e r a t o r " ) ;
37 }) ;
38
39 i t ( ’ f a i l add o p e r a t o r ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
40 a s s e r t . ok ( f a l s e === awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . i sO p e r a t o r (
op e r a t o rAccoun t ) , " Shou ld not be a o p e r a t o r " ) ;
41 t r y {
42 awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . addOpera to r ( use rAccount , { from :
u s e rAccoun t }) ;
43 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
44 r e t u r n ;
45 }
46 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld have f a i l e d to add a o p e r a t o r w i t h a u s e r





1 con s t A lway sZe roBe tOrac l e = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " A lway sZe roBe tOrac l e " ) ;
2
3 con s t a s s e r t = r e q u i r e ( ’ a s s e r t ’ ) ;
4
5 c o n t r a c t ( ’ A lway sZe roBe tOrac l e ’ , a s ync ac coun t s => {
6 l e t o r a c l e ;
7
8 l e t u s e rAccoun t ;
9 l e t adminAccount ;
10 l e t o p e r a t o rAccoun t ;
11
12 be f o r eEach ( a s ync f u n c t i o n ( ) {
13 o r a c l e = awa i t A lway sZe roBe tOrac l e . new ( ) ;
14
15 adminAccount = accoun t s [ 0 ] ;
16 use rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 1 ] ;
17 ope r a t o rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 5 ] ;
18 }) ;
19
20 i t ( ’ i s w i n n e r 0 ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
21 a s s e r t . ok ( awa i t o r a c l e . g e tW i n n e r S e l e c t i o n ( ) , 0 , "Winner s h o u l d
be s e l e c t i o n w i t h i n d e x 0" ) ;
22 }) ;
23
24 i t ( ’ w i n n e r s h o u l d not be chang e ab l e ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
25 t r y {
26 awa i t o r a c l e . s e tW inne r (5 ) ;
27 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
28 r e t u r n ;
29 }
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1 con s t Ba l a n c e s = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " Ba l a n c e s " ) ;
2 con s t Ac c e s sCon t r o l = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " Ac c e s sCon t r o l " ) ;
3 con s t a s s e r t = r e q u i r e ( ’ a s s e r t ’ ) ;
4
5 c o n t r a c t ( ’ Ba l a n c e s ’ , a s ync a c coun t s => {
6 l e t a c c e s s C o n t r o l ;
7
8 l e t u s e rAccoun t ;
9 l e t adminAccount ;
10 l e t o p e r a t o rAccoun t ;
11
12 be f o r eEach ( a s ync f u n c t i o n ( ) {
13 a c c e s s C o n t r o l = awa i t A c c e s sCon t r o l . new ( ) ;
14 b a l a n c e s = awa i t Ba l a n c e s . new ( a c c e s s C o n t r o l . a d d r e s s ) ;
15
16 adminAccount = accoun t s [ 0 ] ;
17 use rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 1 ] ;
18 ope r a t o rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 5 ] ;
19 }) ;
20
21 i t ( ’ d e p o s i t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
22 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . g e tBa l a n c e ( u s e rAccoun t ) ) ,
0 , " Ba l ance s h o u l d be 0 we i " ) ;
23 awa i t b a l a n c e s . d e p o s i t ({ from : use rAccount , v a l u e : 100 }) ;
24 l e t b a l a n c e = p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . g e tBa l a n c e ( u s e rAccoun t ) ) ;
25
26 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( ba l ance , 100 , " Ba l ance s h o u l d be 100 we i " ) ;
27 }) ;
28
29 i t ( ’ w i thd raw ba l a n c e w i t h a v a i l a b l e f u nd s ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
30 b a l a n c e s . d e p o s i t ({ from : use rAccount , v a l u e : 100 }) ;
31 b a l a n c e s . w i thd raw (100 , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
32
33 l e t b a l a n c e = p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . g e tBa l a n c e ( u s e rAccoun t ) ) ;
34
35 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( ba l ance , 0 , " Ba l ance s h o u l d be 0 we i " ) ;
36 }) ;
37
38 i t ( ’ f a i l to w i thd raw ba l a n c e w i t h ou t a v a i l a b l e f u nd s ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
39 awa i t b a l a n c e s . d e p o s i t ({ from : use rAccount , v a l u e : 100 }) ;
40
41 t r y {
42 awa i t b a l a n c e s . w i thd raw (101 , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
43 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
44 r e t u r n ;
45 }
46 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld not a l l o w o v e r b a l a n c e w i t hd r aws " ) ;
47 }) ;
48
104 Appendix B. Betting On The Block dApp Tests
49 i t ( ’ add l i q u i d i t y ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
50 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . t o t a l L i q u i d i t y ( ) ) , 0 , "
L i q u i d i t y s h o u l d be 0 we i " ) ;
51 awa i t b a l a n c e s . a d d L i q u i d i t y ({ from : adminAccount , v a l u e : 100 }) ;
52 l e t l i q u i d i t y = p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . t o t a l L i q u i d i t y ( ) ) ;
53
54 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( l i q u i d i t y , 100 , " L i q u i d i t y s h o u l d be 100 we i " ) ;
55 }) ;
56
57 i t ( ’ w i thd raw l i q u i d i t y w i t h a v a i l a b l e f u nd s ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
58 awa i t b a l a n c e s . a d d L i q u i d i t y ({ from : adminAccount , v a l u e : 100 }) ;
59 b a l a n c e s . w i t h d r a w L i q u i d i t y (100 , { from : adminAccount }) ;
60
61 l e t l i q u i d i t y = p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . t o t a l L i q u i d i t y ( ) ) ;
62
63 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( l i q u i d i t y , 0 , " L i q u i d i t y s h o u l d be 0 we i " ) ;
64 }) ;
65
66 i t ( ’ f a i l to w i thd raw l i q u i d i t y w i t hou t a v a i l a b l e f u nd s ’ , a s ync ( ) =>
{
67 awa i t b a l a n c e s . a d d L i q u i d i t y ({ from : adminAccount , v a l u e : 100 }) ;
68
69 t r y {
70 awa i t b a l a n c e s . w i t h d r a w L i q u i d i t y (101 , { from : adminAccount
}) ;
71 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
72 r e t u r n ;
73 }




78 i t ( ’ f a i l to w i thd raw l i q u i d i t y f o r non admin u s e r ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
79 awa i t b a l a n c e s . a d d L i q u i d i t y ({ from : adminAccount , v a l u e : 100 }) ;
80
81 t r y {
82 awa i t b a l a n c e s . w i t h d r a w L i q u i d i t y (100 , { from : u s e rAccoun t })
;
83 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
84 r e t u r n ;
85 }
86 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld not a l l o w w i t h d r aw a l s f o r non admin u s e r s " ) ;
87 }) ;
88
89 i t ( ’ f a i l to s e t be t h o l d e r w i t hou t p r e v i o u s r e q u e s t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
90 awa i t b a l a n c e s . s e tB e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( adminAccount , { from :
adminAccount }) ;
91 t r y {
92 awa i t b a l a n c e s . s e tB e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( use rAccount , { from :
adminAccount }) ;
93 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
94 r e t u r n ;
95 }
96 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld not a l l o w to s e t a new bet h o l d e r a d d r e s s
w i t h ou t a r e q u e s t " ) ;
97 })
98
99 i t ( ’ f a i l to s e t be t h o l d e r w i t h not enough t ime pa s s ed ’ , a s ync ( ) =>
{
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100 awa i t b a l a n c e s . s e tB e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( adminAccount , { from :
adminAccount }) ;
101 awa i t b a l a n c e s . r e q u e s tUpda t eBe tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( use rAccount , { from
: adminAccount }) ;
102 t r y {
103 awa i t b a l a n c e s . s e tB e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( use rAccount , { from :
adminAccount }) ;
104 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
105 r e t u r n ;
106 }
107 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld not a l l o w to s e t a new bet h o l d e r a d d r e s s




1 con s t Be tOrac l e = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " Be tOrac l e " ) ;
2
3 con s t a s s e r t = r e q u i r e ( ’ a s s e r t ’ ) ;
4
5 c o n t r a c t ( ’ Be tOrac l e ’ , a s ync ac coun t s => {
6 l e t o r a c l e ;
7
8 l e t u s e rAccoun t ;
9 l e t adminAccount ;
10 l e t o p e r a t o rAccoun t ;
11
12 be f o r eEach ( a s ync f u n c t i o n ( ) {
13 o r a c l e = awa i t Be tOrac l e . new ( ) ;
14
15 adminAccount = accoun t s [ 0 ] ;
16 use rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 1 ] ;
17 ope r a t o rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 5 ] ;
18 }) ;
19
20 i t ( ’ w i n n e r s h o u l d not be s e t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
21 a s s e r t . ok ( ! awa i t o r a c l e . i s W i n n e r A v a i l a b l e ( ) , "Winner s h o u l d not
be a v a i l a b l e " ) ;
22 t r y {
23 awa i t o r a c l e . g e tW i n n e r S e l e c t i o n ( ) ;
24 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
25 r e t u r n ;
26 }
27 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld not be p o s s i b l e to ge t a w i nn e r t h a t i s not
s e t " ) ;
28 }) ;
29
30 i t ( ’ f a i l to s e t w i nn e r w i t h non admin account ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
31 t r y {
32 awa i t o r a c l e . s e tW inne r (1 , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
33 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
34 r e t u r n ;
35 }
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36 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld not be p o s s i b l e to s e t a w i nn e r w i t h ou t an
admin account " ) ;
37 }) ;
38
39 i t ( ’ s e t w i nn e r ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
40 o r a c l e . s e tW inne r (1 , { from : adminAccount }) ;
41 a s s e r t . ok ( awa i t o r a c l e . i s W i n n e r A v a i l a b l e ( ) , "Winner s h o u l d be
a v a i l a b l e " ) ;
42 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( p a r s e I n t ( awa i t o r a c l e . g e tW i n n e r S e l e c t i o n ( ) ) , 1 , "
Winner S e l e c t i o n ID i s unexpec t ed " ) ;
43 }) ;
44
45 i t ( ’ w i n n e r s h o u l d not be chang e ab l e ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
46 o r a c l e . s e tW inne r (1 , { from : adminAccount }) ;
47 t r y {
48 awa i t o r a c l e . s e tW inne r (5 ) ;
49 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
50 r e t u r n ;
51 }




1 con s t Even t s = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " Even t s " ) ;
2 con s t Ac c e s sCon t r o l = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " Ac c e s sCon t r o l " ) ;
3 con s t A lway sZe roBe tOrac l e = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " A lway sZe roBe tOrac l e " ) ;
4 con s t a s s e r t = r e q u i r e ( ’ a s s e r t ’ ) ;
5
6 c o n t r a c t ( ’ Even t s ’ , a s ync a c coun t s => {
7 l e t a c c e s s C o n t r o l ;
8 l e t e v e n t s ;
9 l e t o r a c l e ;
10
11 l e t u s e rAccoun t ;
12 l e t adminAccount ;
13 l e t o p e r a t o rAccoun t ;
14
15 l e t e v en t ;
16 l e t s e l e c t i o n s ;
17
18 be f o r eEach ( a s ync f u n c t i o n ( ) {
19 a c c e s s C o n t r o l = awa i t A c c e s sCon t r o l . new ( ) ;
20 e v e n t s = awa i t Even t s . new ( a c c e s s C o n t r o l . a d d r e s s ) ;
21 o r a c l e = awa i t A lway sZe roBe tOrac l e . new ( ) ;
22
23 adminAccount = accoun t s [ 0 ] ;
24 use rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 1 ] ;
25 ope r a t o rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 5 ] ;
26
27 e v en t = {
28 i d : 14 ,
29 name : " t e s t E v e n t " ,
30 b e tO r a c l e : o r a c l e . add r e s s ,
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31 i s S e t t l e d : f a l s e
32 } ;
33
34 s e l e c t i o n s = [
35 {
36 name : " S e l e c t i o n 0" ,
37 odd : 300
38 } ,
39 {
40 name : " S e l e c t i o n 1" ,
41 odd : 150
42 } ] ;
43




47 i t ( ’ c r e a t e e v en t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
48 awa i t e v e n t s . c r e a t eA c t i v e E v e n t ( event , s e l e c t i o n s , { from :
ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ;
49 l e t a c t i v e E v e n t = awa i t e v e n t s . g e tEven t ( e v en t . i d ) ;




53 i t ( ’ c r e a t e s e l e c t i o n s w i t h e v en t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
54 awa i t e v e n t s . c r e a t eA c t i v e E v e n t ( event , s e l e c t i o n s , { from :
ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ;
55 l e t s e l e c t i o n s R e s u l t = awa i t e v e n t s . g e t S e l e c t i o n s ( e v en t . i d ) ;
56 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( s e l e c t i o n s R e s u l t . l e n g t h , 2 , " S e l e c t i o n l e n g t h i s
not as e xp e c t ed " ) ;
57 }) ;
58
59 i t ( ’ change odds ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
60 l e t newOdds = 12341 ;
61 awa i t e v e n t s . c r e a t eA c t i v e E v e n t ( event , s e l e c t i o n s , { from :
ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ;
62 awa i t e v e n t s . changeOdds ( e v en t . i d , 0 , newOdds , { from :
ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ;
63 l e t s e l e c t i o n s R e s u l t = awa i t e v e n t s . g e t S e l e c t i o n s ( e v en t . i d ) ;




67 i t ( ’ s e t t l e e v en t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
68 awa i t e v e n t s . c r e a t eA c t i v e E v e n t ( event , s e l e c t i o n s , { from :
ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ;
69 awa i t e v e n t s . s e tB e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( adminAccount , { from :
adminAccount }) ;
70 awa i t e v e n t s . s e t t l e E v e n t ( e v en t . i d , { from : adminAccount }) ;
71 l e t e v e n t S hou l dBeS e t t l e d = awa i t e v e n t s . g e tEven t ( e v en t . i d ) ;
72 a s s e r t . ok ( e v e n t S hou l dBeS e t t l e d . i s S e t t l e d , " Event s h o u l d be
s e t t l e d " ) ;




76 i t ( ’ c l o s e e v en t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
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77 awa i t e v e n t s . c r e a t eA c t i v e E v e n t ( event , s e l e c t i o n s , { from :
ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ;
78 awa i t e v e n t s . c l o s e E v e n t ( e v en t . i d , { from : ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ;
79 l e t e v e n t S hou l dBeS e t t l e d = awa i t e v e n t s . g e tEven t ( e v en t . i d ) ;





1 con s t Ba l a n c e s = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " Ba l a n c e s " ) ;
2 con s t Even t s = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " Even t s " ) ;
3 con s t Be tHo lde r = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " BetHo lde r " ) ;
4 con s t Ac c e s sCon t r o l = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " Ac c e s sCon t r o l " ) ;
5 con s t A lway sZe roBe tOrac l e = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " A lway sZe roBe tOrac l e " ) ;
6 con s t Be tOrac l e = a r t i f a c t s . r e q u i r e ( " Be tOrac l e " ) ;
7 con s t a s s e r t = r e q u i r e ( ’ a s s e r t ’ ) ;
8
9 c o n t r a c t ( ’ Be tHo lde r ’ , a s ync a c coun t s => {
10 l e t a c c e s s C o n t r o l ;
11 l e t e v e n t s ;
12 l e t o r a c l e ;
13 con s t i n i t i a l L i q u i d i t y = 100 ;
14 con s t i n i t i a l U s e r B a l a n c e = 10 ;
15
16 l e t u s e rAccoun t ;
17 l e t adminAccount ;
18 l e t o p e r a t o rAccoun t ;
19
20 l e t e v en t ;
21 l e t s e l e c t i o n s ;
22
23 be f o r eEach ( a s ync f u n c t i o n ( ) {
24 a c c e s s C o n t r o l = awa i t A c c e s sCon t r o l . new ( ) ;
25 e v e n t s = awa i t Even t s . new ( a c c e s s C o n t r o l . a d d r e s s ) ;
26 o r a c l e = awa i t A lway sZe roBe tOrac l e . new ( ) ;
27 b a l a n c e s = awa i t Ba l a n c e s . new ( a c c e s s C o n t r o l . a d d r e s s ) ;
28 b e tHo l d e r = awa i t Be tHo lde r . new ( e v e n t s . add r e s s , b a l a n c e s . add r e s s
, a c c e s s C o n t r o l . a d d r e s s ) ;
29
30 adminAccount = accoun t s [ 0 ] ;
31 use rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 1 ] ;
32 ope r a t o rAccoun t = accoun t s [ 5 ] ;
33
34 e v en t = {
35 i d : 14 ,
36 name : " t e s t E v e n t " ,
37 b e tO r a c l e : o r a c l e . add r e s s ,
38 i s S e t t l e d : f a l s e
39 } ;
40
41 s e l e c t i o n s = [
42 {
43 name : " S e l e c t i o n 0" ,
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44 odd : 300
45 } ,
46 {
47 name : " S e l e c t i o n 1" ,
48 odd : 150
49 } ] ;
50
51 awa i t a c c e s s C o n t r o l . addOpera to r ( ope ra to rAccoun t , { from :
adminAccount }) ;
52 awa i t e v e n t s . c r e a t eA c t i v e E v e n t ( event , s e l e c t i o n s , { from :
ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ;
53 awa i t b a l a n c e s . d e p o s i t ({ from : use rAccount , v a l u e :
i n i t i a l U s e r B a l a n c e }) ;
54 awa i t b a l a n c e s . a d d L i q u i d i t y ({ from : adminAccount , v a l u e :
i n i t i a l L i q u i d i t y }) ;
55 awa i t b a l a n c e s . s e tB e tHo l d e rAdd r e s s ( b e tHo l d e r . a dd r e s s , { from :
adminAccount }) ;




59 i t ( ’ make s imp l e be t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
60 l e t va lueToBet = 5 ;
61 l e t s e l e c t i o n I d = 0 ;
62 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , va lueToBet , { from
: u s e rAccoun t }) ;
63
64 // Check be t was r e g i s t e r e d
65 l e t b e t s = awa i t b e tHo l d e r . g e tBe t sByEven t I d ( e v en t . i d ) ;
66 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( b e t s . l e n g t h , 1 , " Bets l e n g t h s h o u l d be 1" ) ;
67
68 // Check l i q u i d i t y was updated
69 l e t p o t e n t i a lW i n = s e l e c t i o n s [ s e l e c t i o n I d ] . odd ∗ va lueToBet /
100 − va lueToBet
70 l e t l i q u i d i t y = p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . t o t a l L i q u i d i t y ( ) ) ;
71 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( i n i t i a l L i q u i d i t y − po t e n t i a lW i n , l i q u i d i t y , "
L i q u i d i t y i s d i f f e r e n t than e xp e c t ed " ) ;
72
73 // Check b a l a n c e was updated
74 l e t b a l a n c e = p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . g e tBa l a n c e ( u s e rAccoun t ) ) ;
75 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( i n i t i a l U s e r B a l a n c e − va lueToBet , ba l ance , " User
b a l a n c e i s d i f f e r e n t than e xp e c t e d " ) ;
76 }) ;
77
78 i t ( ’ f a i l to make be t i n u n e x i s t i n g s e l e c t i o n ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
79 l e t va lueToBet = 5 ;
80 l e t s e l e c t i o n I d = 5 ;
81 t r y {
82 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d ,
i n i t i a l U s e r B a l a n c e + 1 , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
83 } catch ( e r r ) {
84 r e t u r n ;
85 }
86 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld f a i l to make a be t " ) ;
87 }) ;
88
89 i t ( ’ f a i l to make be t i n u n e x i s t i n g e v en t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
90 l e t va lueToBet = 5 ;
91 l e t s e l e c t i o n I d = 0 ;
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92 t r y {
93 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d + 1 , s e l e c t i o n I d ,
va lueToBet , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
94 } catch ( e r r ) {
95 r e t u r n ;
96 }
97 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld f a i l to make a be t " ) ;
98 }) ;
99
100 i t ( ’ f a i l to make be t i n c l o s e d e v en t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
101 l e t va lueToBet = 5 ;
102 l e t s e l e c t i o n I d = 0 ;
103
104 awa i t e v e n t s . c l o s e E v e n t ( e v en t . i d , { from : ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ;
105 t r y {
106 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , va lueToBet , {
from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
107 } catch ( e r r ) {
108 r e t u r n ;
109 }
110 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld f a i l to make a be t " ) ;
111 }) ;
112
113 i t ( ’ f a i l to make be t w i t h ou t enough u s e r b a l a n c e ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
114 l e t s e l e c t i o n I d = 0 ;
115 t r y {
116 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d ,
i n i t i a l U s e r B a l a n c e + 1 , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
117 } catch ( e r r ) {
118 r e t u r n ;
119 }
120 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld f a i l to make a be t " ) ;
121 }) ;
122
123 i t ( ’ f a i l to make be t w i t h ou t l i q u i d i t y ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
124 l e t va lueToBet = 5 ;
125 l e t s e l e c t i o n I d = 0 ;
126 awa i t e v e n t s . changeOdds ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , 500000 , { from :
ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ; // Ensu re t h e r e i s no l i q u i d i t y
127 t r y {
128 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , va lueToBet , {
from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
129 } catch ( e r r ) {
130 r e t u r n ;
131 }
132 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld f a i l to make a be t " ) ;
133 }) ;
134
135 i t ( ’ f a i l to make be t w i t h v a l u e 0 ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
136 l e t va lueToBet = 0 ;
137 l e t s e l e c t i o n I d = 0 ;
138 t r y {
139 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , va lueToBet , {
from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
140 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
141 r e t u r n ;
142 }
143 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld f a i l to make a be t " ) ;
144 }) ;
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145
146 i t ( ’ f a i l to make be t i n s topped c o n t r a c t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
147 l e t va lueToBet = 5 ;
148 l e t s e l e c t i o n I d = 5 ;
149 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e tS topped ( t rue , { from : adminAccount }) ;
150 t r y {
151 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , va lueToBet , {
from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
152 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
153 r e t u r n ;
154 }
155 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " Shou ld f a i l to make a be t " ) ;
156 }) ;
157
158 i t ( ’ s e t t l e s im p l e be t ( u s e r won ) ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
159 l e t va lueToBet = 5 ;
160 l e t s e l e c t i o n I d = 0 ;
161 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , va lueToBet , { from
: u s e rAccoun t }) ;
162 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e tW inne rFo rEven t ( e v en t . i d ) ;
163 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e t t l e E v e n t ( e v en t . i d , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
164
165 // Check be t was r e g i s t e r e d
166 l e t eventFound = awa i t e v e n t s . g e tEven t ( e v en t . i d ) ;
167 a s s e r t . ok ( eventFound . i s S e t t l e d , " Event s h o u l d be s e t t l e d " ) ;
168
169 // Check l i q u i d i t y was s e t c o r r e c t l y ( be t was won by the u s e r )
170 l e t p o t e n t i a lW i n = s e l e c t i o n s [ s e l e c t i o n I d ] . odd ∗ va lueToBet /
100 − va lueToBet
171 l e t l i q u i d i t y = p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . t o t a l L i q u i d i t y ( ) ) ;
172 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( i n i t i a l L i q u i d i t y − po t e n t i a lW i n , l i q u i d i t y , "
L i q u i d i t y i s d i f f e r e n t than e xp e c t ed " ) ;
173
174 // Check b a l a n c e was updated
175 l e t b a l a n c e = p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . g e tBa l a n c e ( u s e rAccoun t ) ) ;
176 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( i n i t i a l U s e r B a l a n c e + po t e n t i a lW i n , ba l ance , " User
b a l a n c e i s d i f f e r e n t than e xp e c t e d " ) ;
177 }) ;
178
179 i t ( ’ s e t t l e s im p l e be t ( u s e r l o s t ) ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
180 l e t va lueToBet = 5 ;
181 l e t s e l e c t i o n I d = 1 ;
182 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , va lueToBet , { from
: u s e rAccoun t }) ;
183 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e tW inne rFo rEven t ( e v en t . i d ) ;
184 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e t t l e E v e n t ( e v en t . i d , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
185
186 // Check be t was r e g i s t e r e d
187 l e t eventFound = awa i t e v e n t s . g e tEven t ( e v en t . i d ) ;
188 a s s e r t . ok ( eventFound . i s S e t t l e d , " Event s h o u l d be s e t t l e d " ) ;
189
190 // Check l i q u i d i t y was s e t c o r r e c t l y ( be t was l o s t by the u s e r )
191 l e t l i q u i d i t y = p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . t o t a l L i q u i d i t y ( ) ) ;
192 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( i n i t i a l L i q u i d i t y + va lueToBet , l i q u i d i t y , "
L i q u i d i t y i s d i f f e r e n t than e xp e c t ed " ) ;
193
194 // Check b a l a n c e was updated
195 l e t b a l a n c e = p a r s e I n t ( awa i t b a l a n c e s . g e tBa l a n c e ( u s e rAccoun t ) ) ;
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196 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( i n i t i a l U s e r B a l a n c e − va lueToBet , ba l ance , " User
b a l a n c e i s d i f f e r e n t than e xp e c t ed " ) ;
197 }) ;
198
199 i t ( ’ f a i l to s e t t l e be t w i t hou t r e s u l t a v a i l a b l e ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
200 noRe s u l tO r a c l e = awa i t Be tOrac l e . new ( ) ;
201 e v en t . i d = 151 ;
202 e v en t . b e tO r a c l e = noRe s u l tO r a c l e . a d d r e s s ; // The o r a c l e doesn ’ t
have a w i nn e r s e t y e t
203 awa i t e v e n t s . c r e a t eA c t i v e E v e n t ( event , s e l e c t i o n s , { from :
ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ;
204
205 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , 0 , 1 , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
206 t r y {
207 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e tW inne rFo rEven t ( e v en t . i d ) ;
208 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e t t l e E v e n t ( e v en t . i d , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
209 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
210 r e t u r n ;
211 }
212 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " I t s h o u l d not be p o s s i b l e to s e t t l e a e v en t " ) ;
213 }) ;
214
215 i t ( ’ f a i l to s e t t l e be t w i t hou t s e t t i n g r e s u l t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
216 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , 0 , 1 , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
217 t r y {
218 // awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e tW inne rFo rEven t ( e v en t . i d ) ;
219 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e t t l e E v e n t ( e v en t . i d , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
220 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
221 r e t u r n ;
222 }
223 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " I t s h o u l d not be p o s s i b l e to s e t t l e a e v en t " ) ;
224 }) ;
225
226 i t ( ’ s t op c o n t r a c t and resume i t ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
227 a s s e r t . ok ( ! awa i t b e tHo l d e r . i s S t o p p e d ( ) , " Con t r a c t s h o u l d not be
s topped " ) ;
228
229 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e tS topped ( t rue , { from : adminAccount }) ;
230 a s s e r t . ok ( awa i t b e tHo l d e r . i s S t o p p e d ( ) , " Con t r a c t s h o u l d be
s topped " ) ;
231
232 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e tS topped ( f a l s e , { from : adminAccount }) ;
233 a s s e r t . ok ( ! awa i t b e tHo l d e r . i s S t o p p e d ( ) , " Con t r a c t s h o u l d be
resumed " ) ;
234 }) ;
235
236 i t ( ’ f a i l to s t op c o n t r a c t f o r non admin account ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
237 t r y {
238 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e tS topped ( t rue , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
239 } ca t ch ( e r r ) {
240 a s s e r t . ok ( ! awa i t b e tHo l d e r . i s S t o p p e d ( ) , " Con t r a c t s h o u l d be
resumed " ) ;
241 r e t u r n ;
242 }
243 a s s e r t . f a i l ( " I t s h o u l d not be p o s s i b l e to s top the c o n t r a c t " ) ;
244 }) ;
245
246 i t ( ’ ge t u s e r b e t s ’ , a s ync ( ) => {
247 l e t va lueToBet = 1 ;
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248 l e t s e l e c t i o n I d = 0 ;
249 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , va lueToBet , { from
: u s e rAccoun t }) ;
250 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , va lueToBet , { from
: u s e rAccoun t }) ;
251 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , va lueToBet , { from
: u s e rAccoun t }) ;
252 awa i t b a l a n c e s . d e p o s i t ({ from : ope ra to rAccoun t , v a l u e : va lueToBet
}) ;
253 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . makeBet ( e v en t . i d , s e l e c t i o n I d , va lueToBet , { from
: ope r a t o rAccoun t }) ; // s h o u l d not be r e t u r n e d
254
255 l e t u s e rB e t sNo t S e t t l e d = awa i t b e tHo l d e r . ge tBet sByUse r (
u s e rAccoun t ) ;
256
257 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( u s e rB e t sNo t S e t t l e d . l e n g t h , 3 , " User s h o u l d have 3
b e t s " ) ;
258 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( ! u s e rB e t sNo t S e t t l e d [ 0 ] . i s S e t t l e d , t r ue , " User
s h o u l d not have s e t t l e d b e t s " ) ;
259
260 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e tW inne rFo rEven t ( e v en t . i d ) ;
261 awa i t b e tHo l d e r . s e t t l e E v e n t ( e v en t . i d , { from : u s e rAccoun t }) ;
262
263 l e t u s e r B e t s S e t t l e d = awa i t b e tHo l d e r . ge tBet sByUse r ( u s e rAccoun t )
;
264 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( u s e r B e t s S e t t l e d . l e ng t h , 3 , " User s h o u l d have 3 b e t s
" ) ;
265 a s s e r t . e q u a l ( u s e r B e t s S e t t l e d [ 0 ] . i s S e t t l e d , t r ue , " User s h o u l d
have s e t t l e d b e t s " ) ;
266 }) ;
267
268
269 }) ;
